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ABSTRACT
Biological Dimension of the Value Theory of the
ANISA Educational Model (August 1974)
S. Pattabi Raman, B.Sc. (Hons) Delhi
M.Sc. (Tech) Calcutta
Ph.D. Calcutta
Directed by: Professor Daniel C. Jordan
The dissertation undertakes two tasks: (1) a dis-
cussion of the major issues that must be dealt with in for-
mulating a comprehensive value theory for education and
show how the ANISA Model in its present state of develop-
ment is handling those issues; (2) establishment of empir-
ical and theoretical referents from the biological sciences
to undergird the deductive formulation of the ANISA value
theory
.
Perspectives obtained from the current theories pro-
posed by axiologists, social psychologists and cultural
anthropologists point out to one basic concern. No matter
how comprehensive becomes our understanding of value pheno-
mena and their ramifications in man’s becoming, we still
need a set of conceptual guidelines from some other dimen-
sion of human reality which will serve as a general frame
of reference to validate the postulates of the value theory.
Starting from ANISA’ s definition of value as the pattern of
structuring of the energy accrued as man actualizes his
potentialities, the submission discusses the factors involved
Vlll
in such structuring and makes a case for broadening the
paradigm of value inquiry by including subjective aim and
ideals which in the ultimate analysis serve as a blue print
for structuring actualized potentialities -- for creating
values
.
The views obtained on the nature of man and his destiny
from the vantage point of modern theories of biological
evolution, as represented by the works of Julian Huxley,
Waddington and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, clearly indicate
the crucial role of the emergence of consciousness in man’s
future evolution. These theories of emergent evolution
sound the death knell of both the materialistic and vitalistic
views of the universe thus supporting the Whiteheadian
’organismic’ view of the universe, which forms the philosoph-
ical underpinning of the ANISA model.
The evolution of consciousness has given man the pro-
pensity to be aware of the unknowns in his environment and
the capacity for structuring the unknowns by forming of
ideals. The ideals function as a 'lure' towards future
possibilities and thus become the chief determinant of the
homeorhetic path of becoming and thereby the effective in-
strument of collective evolution of mankind. A theory of
value is in essence another facet of the theory of being and
becoming. By consciously choosing ideals man restructures
his pattern of energy utilization and thereby restructures
his values and value systems and takes charge of his own
destiny
.
IX
The subjective aims or the ideals that serve as the
'lure' for the structuring of the pattern of utilization of
human energy obtain their validation on the basis of
whether or not they facilitate, both in ontogenesis and
phylogenesis, the kind of homeorhesis that places mankind
into chreods leading to greater levels of collective organi-
zation and human solidarity -- conditions which guarantee
and increase the quality of survival.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The most common battle cry of reform movements in
education throughout history has centered around the
irrelevance of educational goals and practices to the
needs and exigencies of the day. Never before has the cry
been so desperate and heart-rending than today, a portentous
juncture in human evolution, as man stands poised with a
feeling of impotent perplexity, at the summit of the "Great
Divide” -- where he can make a conscious choice either to
turn in the right direction and enter a new world of justice,
peace and tranquility -- or he can continue downwards along
the old way of injustice, war and turmoil --a course which
leads inescapably to the extirpation of the human race.
About two generations ago, H. G. Wells wrote that man-
kind was engaged in a race between education and catastrophe,
for he was acutely conscious of the cleavages within our
culture, fissures which, as they widen, will in time prove
to be calamitous. The race was almost lost in the horrors
of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In the midst of the nuclear
holocaust unleashed by men, the idea took shape in the
minds of some other men with lofty and far-sighted vision,
to prevent repetition of a similar catastrophe and to work
together for the emergence of a new and universal fraternity
of mankind through education. This was to be achieved by
2acting on man himself, the cause of the catastrophe, by
appealing to what is most noble in him. As an embodiment
of an effort to use educational, scientific and cultural
instruments for humanitarian ends on an international scale,
the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (Unesco) took shape in 1946 under the auspices
of the United Nations. It was the first attempt to create
a public institution in which ideas, rather than individual
or political power, were to be the acknowledged instruments
for achieving the "intellectual and moral solidarity of
mankind." With a clear mandate to revamp education and
educate mankind for a world community, with its specialized
agencies and committees, and all the financial and intell-
ectual resources it could muster, Unesco went about its
business with none other than Julian Huxley with his great
intellectual and cultural prestige, energy and humor, as
its first director general. This unprecedented gigantic
international undertaking in educational planning and
reform caused a spectacular educational "explosion," creat-
ing a new awareness and ushering in a highly dynamic decade
for education in all countries. Long muted human rights
came to be openly declared and vigorously pursued, includ-
ing the right to education. (Hersch, 1969.) Education be-
came accepted by economic policy-makers not merely as a
desirable social service but as an essential sector for
3overall national development. Unesco declared educational
planning one of its top priorities, developing its program
by supplying educational planning experts to more than
eighty countries and by establishing regional and inter-
national training and research centers.
World Crisis in Education
Despite spectacular educational expansion, there were
many disappointments in educational planning. A world
survey of problems and prospects in educational planning
reports
:
There was as it remains today, a great gap
between words and deeds -- between policies pro-
claimed by ministers attending conferences and the
actions taken in their countries; between method-
ologies prepared by theoreticians and their appli-
cation^ the actual planning process. The many
educational planning units often remained under-
staffed without effective links, -- isolated from
the main stream of educational decision making.
Meanwhile, in the absence of overall integrated
planning, basic educational priorities vacillated
-- jumping from primary education at first to
vocational training, teacher training, secondary
general education, higher education and finally
to adult literacy training. The inevitable result
was the emergence of wasteful imbalances both within
the educational system and its environment
.
(Unesco
,
1970, p. 10
.
)
(emphasis mine)
Recognizing the inadequacies of earlier piecemeal,
short range and unintegrated educational planning, many
countries wrote new prescriptions which, among other things,
demanded that educational planning should have "a compre-
hensive coverage, embracing all levels and parts of the
4educational system in a single view including qualitative
and quantitative aspects" (Unesco, 1970, p. 11). if one
seeks dispassionately for reasons why education was not
more successfully planned and implemented to meet the im-
mediate and future needs of the world's peoples, the
explanation may be found in a combination of external and
internal constraints of the planning operation. Soon it
became evident to the planners that:
...without a clear idea of its objectives, an
educational system is as a ship at sea with no
destination; it cannot plan its course and can
end up simply turning circles. A nation's educa-
tional objectives, reflecting society's idea of
its own future, must be decided by the society as
a whole and its chosen leaders. The idea of the
future should embrace basic human values, ethical,
cultural and aesthetic, and also the various roles
the individual will be required to play in society,
as a citizen, worker and member of a family. In
translating these overall goals into educational
objectives those responsible for educational plan-
ning can help by insisting that there be reasonable
consistency and an order of priority among various
objectives, since not all of them can be pursued
at full speed simultaneously. They must make sure
that the definition of objectives and their priority
rating is understood as a continuing process that
should be periodically reviewed (Unesco, 1970, p. 12).
Following the enactment of the International Education
Act of 1966, President Lyndon Johnson called for an inter-
national conference "to stimulate deeper mutual under-
standing among nations of major educational problems
facing the world." The proceedings of the conference on
"World Crisis in Education" thus convened in Williamsburg,
Virginia in 1967, provided us with a general index of the
5current thinking on the crisis in education we face today
and bring to a sharp focus the deep-seated maladjustments
in most educational systems that are hurling us to the
vortex of a crisis (Bereday, 1969).
Education and the American Scene
While previous pages depict the magnitude of disparity
between expectation and achievement in education in the
international sphere, on the American scene, education is
passing from crisis to disaster in its quest for relevance.
Few undertakings in contemporary American life have provoked
such continuing controversy as education and its institu-
tional operations. A plethora of articles, countless
speeches, books, and numerous conference reports play end-
less variations on the same platitudinous theme lamenting
the built- in- inertia of the educational system that in-
sulates it from change and self-renewal. The tone of this
lament is reflected in the following cogent analysis:
At every level of the education professions the
pressure is felt and the complaints registered.
Jacques Barzun documents how "drudgery, discipline,
and conformity" constitute the basic syndrome of
traditional education. George Leonard condenses
a complex diagnosis into one simple statement:
"The ecstacy has gone out of education." Paul
Goodman, in Compulsory Miseducation , describes
education as a system of brainwashing which leads
to "spiritual destruction." Carl Rogers views the
educational system as a kind of prison where the
person is not free to learn; John Holt describes
the many ways in which the system programs a
guaranteed failure for significant numbers of
children. Kozol details how education mediates
6death at an early age.” Weinstein and thoseinterested in humanistic education view the current
system as one which often punishes an expression01 feeling and renders the process of acquiringknowledge a sterile, mostly irrelevant, and evendestructive experience. Silberman's efforts atdiagnosis indicate that education is in a period of
serious crises. As a system, it does not address
the development of the whole person; rather itfragments, compartmentalizes, and precipitates
sel f
- al ienat ion . Herbert Kohl points to the
authoritarian atmosphere of the traditional school
and how it snuffs out the life of learning. Caleb
Gattegno argues that learning is the life of educa-
tion and in order to sustain that life, teaching
must be ’’subordinated to learning.” Yet, in many
schools learning is subordinate to everything else.
William Glasser, in Schools Without Failure
,
ill-
ustrates how education's ill health is directly
correlated with "a philosophy of non- involvement
,
non- relevance
,
and a limited emphasis on thinking”
(Jordan and Streets, 1974, p. 1).
Leaders on every level of American society, from the
Presidency to the local Parent-Teacher Association, con-
cur on the desperate need for educational reform.
From the vantage point of the year 2000 if not
earlier, the last decade of education will undoubtedly
appear as the most bizarre in terms of the methods it used
when compared to other human intellectual endeavors. Edu-
cation is passing from crisis to crisis because as a
discipline it neither begins its endeavors with tested
principles, nor is there any plan to test the principles
on which the endeavors are launched. There is a great
deal of what is called ’experimentation’ going on in
American education, but most of it can hardly be called
experimentation in the scientific sense since it is not
7conducted with any set of controls. The fact that something
is simply new does not make it experimental. We are con-
fronted today with a body of beliefs and attitudes about
education, which, although they are the determining in-
fluence in our educational system, have not been subjected
to careful analysis. The American Educational Research
Association identified two significant characteristics of
the condition of research in education: disorganization
and lack of orientation to other behavioral sciences. It
went on to say
...by disorganization we mean the condition in
which, at present, research too often proceeds
without explicit theoretical framework, in intel-
lectual disarray, to the testing of myriads of
arbitrary, unrationalized hypotheses (American
Educational Research Association, 1953
,
p. 657 ).
Educational research must eventually come to mean more
than an endless testing of hypotheses that are unconnected
and trivial. It must include an inquiry into educational
objectives and a questioning of assumptions underlying
them in an attempt to find a unifying frame of reference
from which explicit criteria for determining the relevance
of objectives and their priority.
Compounding the shortcomings in educational research
methodology is the knowledge explosion of this century.
Until recently, the main task of education has been con-
sidered the transmission of the traditions and information
processed by the society to new generations. In a
8relatively static situation, this has meant that the
teacher has but to communicate his own knowledge and exper-
ience acquired in turn from his own teachers. In a world
dominated by change, with the reservoir of human knowledge
spectacularly swelling beyond imagination within the life
time of the teacher, nay even within the educational cycle
of the student, and with the growing aspirations of
societies in the light of modern technology, much of the
knowledge, and many of the methods and attitudes of the
past have become obsolete.
Need for New Directions
Without belaboring the obvious any further, it will
suffice to say that there is an imperative need for new
goals, purposes, methods and directions in education on
all levels: local, national, and international. There is
a growing recognition of a great need for a distillation
of the thinking of the past half century and for an under-
standing of the direction being taken by education. To
chart a rational course towards its objectives, we need
to know how the educational system originated and what
discernible forces in the past and present are likely to
affect its future. For such a diagnosis, we must use all
the instruments at our disposal. Major blind spots in an
educational system will seriously impede plotting a re-
liable future course.
9The conclusion seems inescapable that if education is
to make its proper contribution to the growth of the
individual and the society’s development, then educational
systems everywhere must apply the methods of science and
undergo sweeping revolutionary changes, as with medicine,
engineering and technology, and other fields of hard
sciences have already done and are still doing. A dynamic
transformation of the educational system which will enable
it to cultivate adjustment to change and make innovation
fruitful can come only when education adopts the methods
of science, which has opened to modern man worlds of in-
conceivable dimensions -- submicroscopic to supergalactic.
To apply scientific methods to education requires
articulating a comprehensive body of theory which will
address the fundamental problems and issues facing educa-
tion and which at the same time will serve as a definitive
guide to practice. The effectiveness of the application
can and should then be tested out over periods of time.
Theories enable us to subsume under a few principles a
vast array of what may first appear to be unrelated facts.
Rene Dubos, the well-known microbiologist of the Rocke-
feller Institute, once wrote that after a review of all
the important scientific discoveries of the last couple of
centuries -- such as those of Darwin, Freud, Einstein --
he found that not one of them was a result of piling up
10
fact on fact. The discoveries resulted from the scientist's
perception of the significance of the relationships and the
meaningful pattern among facts, which then gave rise to
the resultant theories. (May, 1967, p. 48.)
Education has yet to find a way of becoming a scien-
tific enterprise carried on by a self-governing community
of inquirers who conduct themselves in accordance with an
unwritten but binding code, bowing to the constraints of
theory and yet having infinite scope for original and in-
novative research to refine the theory. In such an enter-
prise, theory has the role of a self-correcting device or
internal guardianship as a basic element. Unless education
has some such criteria which can be used as a corrective
instrument for the procedures involved, it can never emerge
as a science on its own standing.
The need to establish a science of education is con-
firmed by the following statement of a former Associate
U.S. Commissioner of Education:
In principle, the American educational commit-
ment has always been that every child should be
educated to his full potential, but this commit-
ment has been voiced in terms of resources such
as teachers, books, space, and equipment. When
a child has failed to learn, school personnel
have assigned him a label -- slow, or unmotivated,
or retarded. Our schools must assume a revised
commitment that every child shall learn. Such
a commitment must include a willingness to change
a system which does not work and define one which
does, to seek causes of failure in a system and
its personnel instead of focusing solely on
students (Lessinger, 1974).
11
The history of American educational practices during
the past fifty years verifies the repeated attempts made
to formulate a theory of education. But what seemed to
be lacking was a 'science of man' on which to build its
theory, and this science of man was initially sought from
psychology. Because of the characteristic relation between
psychology and education, psychological theories have
always intrigued educators. Most educational theories
are spin-offs of major theoretical developments in psych-
ology. For example, Gestalt psychology, field theory,
psychoanalytic theory, and stimulus-response theory, which
were formulated to explain some aspects of behavior and
learning, were tried out in educational contexts and con-
tinue to be explored by educators. Contributions of James,
Watson, Dewey, Thorndyke, Freud, Piaget and Skinner no doubt
conferred an air of scientific respectability to educational
practice. The weaknesses of the theories, Schwab observes:
...arise from two sources: the inevitable in-
completeness of the subject matters of theories
and the partiality of the view each takes of
its already incomplete subject. Incompleteness
of the subject is easily seen in the entirely
cognitive theory which takes no account of the
emotional needs and satisfactions.... Incom-
pleteness of the subject is also visible in
personality theories which reduce the whole
society to an appendage of personality and in
sociological theories which reduce personality
to an artifact of society. Partiality of view
is exemplified by the Freudian treatment of per-
sonality after the analogue of a developing,
differentiating organism, a treatment which makes
it extremely difficult to deal directly with problems
of interpersonal relations (Schwab, 1970, p. 11).
12
These weaknesses, characterized by a lack of comprehen-
siveness, undoubtedly vitiate the value of a theory.
In his search for a relevant educational theory,
McDonald has enumerated the kinds of characteristics any
psychological theory must have to win a significant place
as an educational theory and practice:
In the first place, its scientific character must
be impeccable.
Secondly, since education is a social enterprise,
the theory must be social in character or must
treat social problems in a significant way.
Third, the theory must account for developmental
phenomena
.
Fourth, the theory must promise some form of control,
i.e., it has systems that lead to procedures with
predictable effects.
Fifth, the theory must somehow evidence its concern
for the individual (McDonald, 1964)
.
No psychological theory has fulfilled these characteristics
and therefore no comprehensive educational theory has yet
been derived. "There seems to be no good reason," argues
McDonald, "for educational theory to be committed to any
single theory short of a comprehensive science of man."
Scope of the ANISA Educational Model
The realization of a need in the social world has
always been followed by the establishment of institutions
responding to that need. Goals and ideals will never have
any social effect and will always remain in the realm of
13
hopefulness and utopia unless they are institutionalized
to bring them to the realm of specific activity. The
American National Institute of Social Advancement (ANISA)
was designed precisely to attempt a frontal attack to make
education a scientific enterprise in response to the lack
of any coordinated multidisciplinary team approach to edu-
cation, its planning and implementation.
It is evident that the coherence and efficacy of any
educational program designed to address the total develop-
ment of man, to a large extent, lies in the comprehensive-
ness of its theory of the development of man -- how he comes
to be what he should be. Phenix succinctly states:
The problem of man and his becoming is particularly
urgent for parents, teachers, school officials and
citizens concerned with the conduct of education.
To choose soundly what to teach and how to teach it,
to judge what educational goals are practicable and
what ones are not -- such wisdom requires the best
possible understanding of human nature and its trans-
formation (Phenix, 1964, p. 3).
Furthermore, Belth writes:
The level of cultural maturity of a society can
be determined by the theory it holds about educa-
tion of its rising generations. For any educa-
tional theory entails a concept of the relation-
ship between man and the world he must cope with
and learn to organize and direct. It contains,
too, an interpretation of the effect which one
has upon the potentialities of the other and
explains how this effect comes about. Such inter-
pretative concepts suggest the procedures which
should accomplish the goals implicit in a parti-
cular theory of education (Belth, 1965, p. 39).
Obviously, in the early stages of the conceptualization of
14
the ANISA model, articulating a theory of development -- of
man’s being and becoming -- was the first order of business.
hhere is this knowledge of man and his becoming to
be obtained? More than thirty years ago, Alexis Carrel
wrote that Man has been unable to organize himself because
he did not understand his own nature (Carrel, 1939 ).
Unfortunately, there is no single brand of specialists to
whom one can turn for authoritative answers about man as
a total entity. As Bahm observes, each science or other
area of specialty discovers something essential to the
nature of man and then tries to reduce the significance of
other essentials to its own. A chemist may depict the
reality of man as replicating macromolecules. A physicist
may explain him primarily as a complicated electrical
mechanism. A biologist may claim him as solely a creature
of evolution. A physiologist may view him entirely as a
product of his organs, glands, diet, diseases and their
development. An anthropologist may depict him as only a
product of his culture. A social psychologist may describe
him as a victim of his social environment. A linguist may
believe him to be completely molded by his language. An
artist or musician may see man as primarily an aesthetic
being. Each of these specialists has a contribution to
make to man’s understanding of himself. Bahm concludes,
’’But whenever a specialist of any kind tries to reduce the
whole of man to any one part of him he makes him somewhat
15
antihumanistic" (Bahm, 1964, p. 349 ).
Sorting out this dilemma required a broader conceptual
framework which will integrate purposefully all that is
known about human growth and development. This broader
framework was to be found in a philosophy which contains
the most comprehensive view of the nature of man. To be
comprehensive m its scope, a theory of development must
emerge from such a philosophical base -- one which expli-
cates the nature of man, his purpose and potentialities,
and how he comes to know, feel, and act. Drawing heavily
on a Whiteheadian expression of the philosophy of organism,
the ANISA Model views man as a creature at the apex of
creation whose reality essentially inheres in the process
of his becoming -- translating his unlimited potentialities
into actuality (Jordan and Shepard, 1972). From this
philosophical base, a set of coherent, mutually compatible,
complimentary theories^" of development, curriculum, pedagogy,
administration, and evaluation have been generated (Jordan
and Streets, 1973). (See flow chart, p. 16, Fig. 1.)
Theory refers to a system of propositions and defini-
tions which explain particular phenomena and how they are
1. Because a fuller explanation of the theories is
beyond the scope of this submission, a summary
statement on the ANISA Model is appended (Appendix)
.
AN1SA MODEL*
FIG I
Jordan, D. C. and Streets, D. T. Releasing
the potentialities of the Child: A new
perspective on child-rearing, day care
and early childhood education.
Unpublished manuscript. 1972
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related. The propositions may be arrived at inductively
and/or deductively and can be used to generate specific
hypotheses which can be empirically tested. The Euclidean
system for geometry is such a system. Furthermore all
theories in the most exact of our natural sciences -- such
as quantum theories in physics -- comprise such a system. 2
There is no a priori reason why similar deductive and in-
ductive procedures should be impossible in the construction
of educational theory. For the construction of such a
system to understand man and his becoming, it is necessary
that the system not only fulfilled the logical requirements
of consistency and non-contradiction, but also integrates
the entire phenomena of human experience. The cosmology of
Whitehead provides a conceptual framework for such an inte-
gration which serves to identify and order all the con-
stituent parts of the process of education into a single
coherent system.
Purpose of the Present Study
When medicine draws on the accumulated knowledge of
its mother sciences, e.g., biology, and general physiology,
for curing the ills of the human organism, it need not
2. A fuller discussion of this idea is provided by Werkmeister,
W. H. in "An Epistemological Basis for Quantum Physics,"
Philosophy of Science
,
17
,
1950, p. 1-25.
18
hesitate about the goals to be attained or the methods to
be used. It has a clear mandate to exploit the distilled
knowledge of the advanced sciences while itself contribut-
ing to the development of intermediary disciplines like
pathology, pharmacodynamics, etc. In contrast, when educa-
tion seeks to apply the advances in psychology, sociology,
anthropology and other disciplines that have to do with man
and his development, it is confronted with a tangle of
questions concerning not only ends but also means. Issues
debated in education can be divided into two broad cate-
gories: those which explore the relevance and relationship
of other human sciences and related disciplines to education
and those which consider questions purely internal to the
process of education, defined more or less in terms of a
profession. There is extensive experimentation and innova-
tion going on in American education mostly in the later
category and this, to a great extend, accounts for its
superficiality and inability to strengthen education as a
dynamic agent for social change.
With the one exception of psychology, the advances
in the mother disciplines of education, viz., sociology,
anthropology, philosophy, biology, aesthetics, religion,
receive relatively minimal attention from present-day
educators. The reason for this complacency and apathy
is twofold. The first is the myopic vision of the present-
day educators when they come to defining the purpose of
19
education itself. Solution of this problem, which con-
stitutes the ultimate test for the educators, is of para-
mount importance in the microcosm of education for it
becomes decisive in the macrocosm of the child's future.
The second, closely related to the first, is the academic
aloofness of many educators, rationalized in the name of
scientific objectivity, in dealing with the problem of
VALUE which pervades and undergirds all other sciences that
study man and his development. These sciences consider
value as a major area of concern and indeed a challenge
to the progress and relevance of their respective dis-
ciplines
.
While everyone is ready to affirm the basic importance
of values in education, few educators have really taken
the arduous task of probing into the nature of values,
their origin, their sanction, their growth, and their
relevance to the process of education. It would be widely
agreed, as Hardie affirms, that the deadlock in formulating
any educational theory that could be translated into educa-
tional practice relevant to modern societal needs, will
center around the nature of value (Hardie, 1961) . It is
an oversimplification, but generally true, that many edu-
cators feel that socially acceptable values could be
developed by self-discovery and experimentation by the
young, but the degree to which teachers, parents and other
adults should intervene in this process remains in doubt
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for many. They tend to emphasize the need for informed
and rational judgment in the value-building process without
any clear notion as to what ends the value-building process
should be aimed at. Because of inattention the study of
values remains, in Brameld's words, "the most neglected
problem in American education" (Brameld, 1966, p. 151).
The modern distrust of values as something emotional
and illusory and the virtual disappearance of value theory
in current deliberations on education only reflect the
state of chaos and confusion of the field itself in respect
to its goals and purposes. No knowledge of lasting inter-
est can thrive in an intellectual climate where values are
at a discount. Recognition of this vacuum inspired an
attempt to formulate a unified theory of value during the
conceptualization of the ANISA COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATIONAL
MODEL. It soon became apparent that the knowledge needed
for generating a value theory in the ANISA Model should be
sought from a comprehensive knowledge of human growth and
development studied from every possible angle by any
promising method consistent with the philosophical base
of the model and its redefinition of the process of educa-
tion. Hence studies had to be aimed at a unified treatment
of man’s values on different ontological levels of human
endeavor and evolution, viz., biological, psychological,
technological, sociological, aesthetic, and philosophical.
As Whitehead (1933) remarked, "Ideas and values have no
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existence or real importance until they are made an inte-
gral part of some concrete entity -- in this case until
they are made an integral part of life and personality of
the growing organism."
The purpose of this study is a) to submit for con-
sideration a discussion of the major issues that must be
dealt with in formulating a comprehensive value theory and
show how the ANISA Model can in its present state of
development handle those issues fully and satisfactorily,
and b) to establish empirical and theoretical referents
from the biological sciences to undergird the deductive
formulation of the ANISA value theory.
CHAPTER II
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
One of the traditional epistemological problems which
educators share with philosophers is that of facts versus
values. As Cooper (1954) observes, the problem has always
been "susceptible to confusions of linguistic and philo-
sophical considerations on the one hand, with empirical
and scientific considerations on the other." This is true
especially when practical methods of education are the
ultimate concern. The educator has the task of relating
both philosophy and pure science to the applied science of
education and on this basis construct an educational theory.
One often wonders if there ever will be a time when
educators will be free from questions of problems relat-
ing to their aims and purposes. In every age, educators not
only face new problems unique to their times, but they also
have the obligation to redefine many old problems in the
light of present conditions. A spokesman for his age,
Aristotle, said,
As things are, there is disagreement about the
things to be taught, whether we look to virtue
of the best life. Neither is it clear whether
education should be more concerned with intel-
lectual or moral virtue. The existing practice
is perplexing; no one knows on what principle
we should proceed -- should the useful in life,
or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge
be the aim of our training; all three opinions
have been entertained. Again about the means
there is no agreement; for different persons,
23
starting with different
of virtue, naturally disagree about the practiceOl 1 1 * t « i
ideas about the nature
The concerns expressed in the above statements of
Aristotle as to the aims of education still continue to
occupy the priority list in the agenda of any meeting of
the present day educators. They find themselves ever
increasingly drawn into the labyrinth of conflicting
ideologies. Contemporary conditions have in fact exacerbated
the problem, as the following remarks of Childs indicate:
In order to encourage, we must also discourage;
in order to foster we must also hinder; in order
to emphasize the significant, we must identify
the non- significant
; and finally in order to
select and focus attention on certain subject
matters of life, we have to reject and ignore
other subject matters. Were our values different
our selections and our rejections would also
be different. The process of selecting and
rejecting, of fostering and hindering, of dis-
tinguishing the lovely from the unlovely, and
of discriminating the important from the un-
important is unending in education (Childs,
1950, p. 19-20)
.
It is tempting to become cynical and witty about the
ways the educational institutions cope with the conflicts,
especially when one is a bystander. Obviously, the insti-
tutions are involved with value choices and judgments which
cut to the core of human concerns for many aspects of value
1. Aristotle’s Politics . Jowett translation. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1885
,
p. 245.
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increasingly pervade and undergird the whole process of
providing and guiding experience in an educational setting.
Indeed it is difficult to conceive any sphere of activity
that an educator is involved in that would not deeply
involve some aspect of value. When we talk about educa-
tional reforms, we are not just talking about revamping
education, but are in a way debating the kind of society
we desire, the kinds of priorities the society should be
committed to and the kind of life we wish our future citi-
zens to pursue. Again, since education is a social enter-
prise and a human pursuit, different ideas about what its
purpose should be arise from different concepts of
a) man's destiny, b) what must man do in order to prepare
for this destiny? c) what constitutes human nature? These
are issues which move out of the realm of traditional educa-
tion and concern the very fabric of our civilization. In
that sense, they are universal and timeless. Differences
in educational practice -- in courses of study, teaching
methods, patterns of support and control -- are only reflec-
tions of different beliefs about such matters as human
nature, nature of knowledge, and value. These beliefs are
the foundations of any educational philosophy -- thus an
educational theory -- which guides the course of action.
Value Theory and Educational Practice
To those who are committed to the profession, education
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implies the transmission of both facts and values that are
worthwhile and not detrimental to the youngsters.
There is an uneasy feeling on the part of educators,
especially curriculum specialists, that while facts are
well taken care of by various sciences, something called
value” is not. They are preoccupied with finding a
solution in an academic context with "objectivity,”
i.e., through the respectable method of historical, anthro-
pological, sociological, and logical analysis. They have
found no satisfactory answers.
Curriculum is much more than a timetable and a descrip-
tion of the subject matter to be taught. It lays down
principle objectives of teaching, the attitudes which should
be developed in pupils toward learning and about life in
general, the skills which education should promote. The
entire complex of educational objectives and the ways and
techniques by which they are achieved must be involved.
Curriculum planning is an essential part of educational
planning which sets out explicitly the general objectives
of an educational system and the means through which these
objectives are achieved.
One of the greatest weaknesses in curricular practice
is the failure to treat the problems involved in making
specific judgments of comparative value when we formulate
our objectives. Clearly, there is a need from value
theory constant guidance in making value judgments.
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educations
problems in the planning and execution of major
1 innovations, a report on curriculum innovation
says, "is due to the... need to develop attitudes of mind
towards making innovations more acceptable (OCED, 1955
p. 31).
It should be realized that any such attempt to change
attitudes will have more meaning if it is shaped by
guiding principles that are systematized to form a philo-
sophical view that delineates purpose, direction, and goals
This implies the cultivation of right attitudes of mind in
pupils and teachers so that they may be receptive to new
developments in knowledge, and free themselves from an
emotional commitment to error.
Teaching is a distinct goal-directed activity and
involves a general engagement of the teacher's judgment
on experience as it relates to particular goals. In
teaching, we do not impose our will on the student, but
introduce him to the many mansions of the heritage in
which we ourselves strive to live and to the improvement
of which we are ourselves dedicated.
Throwing a child in the river is not itself sufficient
to teach him how to swim. Teaching normally involves show-
ing him how to do something by action or example and not
merely setting up conditions and environments for inter-
action under which he may flounder without guidance.
Needless to say, and adequate general theory of value
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must not only clarify many matters in educational policy
and practice but must extend and strengthen the philosoph-
ical foundations for an improved curricular and pedagogical
theory
.
Value Theory and the ANISA Model
Since all education is based on some set of objectives
and since all objectives imply a prior commitment to a set
of principles as to what is really worthwhile (valued) in
the ultimate analysis, any discussion of educational ob-
jectives presupposes prior assumptions about the nature and
scope of value. This means that the ultimate criteria for
the validity of our objectives rests on the viability of
the theory of value.
This will be illustrated as follows. Using a defini-
tion of education consistent with its etymology 2 as: The
conscious drawing out of all the potentialities of the
human organism by guiding its interaction with the environ-
ment in a manner so as to insure the maximum growth and
development of the organism for the ultimate purpose of
2. One of the most hotly debated issues in education
today is the definition and purpose of education.
Even in this approach of defining education from
its etymology, people have different opinions.
For some the root word is "educe" or "educere"
....to draw out, while for others it is "educare"
....to bring up or rear (Peters, 1966).
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achieving the organism's goal. In constructing the Model's
educational theory, we had to consider the various ques-
tions which arise from such a definition, such as:
What is the nature of the human organism?
How does it differ from other forms of creation?
What is the nature of human potential?
What is the process by which the human potentialities
are actualized?
How does this differ from the processes of the release
of the potentialities of other biological organisms?
How does learning take place?
Is there a difference between learning and growth?
How is knowledge gained?
What are the characteristics of growth and development?
How does this relate to the learning process?
How does one evaluate the process of actualization
of a potential?
What is meant by interaction with the environment?
What is an environment?
Are all environments the same?
How many categories are there?
Can the interaction be guided?
When should guidance be given? If so, how?
These are certainly some of the basic issues that any
comprehensive educational theory should attempt to clarify.
It is obvious that the ANISA Educational theory has subsumed
under it component theories of development, of learning, of
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curriculum, of pedagogy, of evaluation and of administra-
n, etc. (see p. 16) . All these theories have their
metaphysical, ontological, and axiological underpinnings
derived from the same philosophical base. Just as our
understanding of the nature of knowledge 3 (epistemology)
has had a tremendous impact on the learning theory and cur-
riculum practice, pedagogy, and evaluation, advances in
the other branches of philosophy will have their impact
on the above theories. It is evident that the nature of
our understanding of the science of value (thereby a theory
of value) will have a significant effect on the stand taken
in the above-mentioned theories and consequently on educa-
tion as a whole.
In terms of education, the understanding, conditions,
and contexts in which values in an individual arise is of
cardinal importance for it enables us to gain better control
of the forces operative in the formation of human person-
ality and in social interaction. Furthermore, men not
only have values; they also make value judgments and
develop the process of valuing.
3. The epistemological quest of the Genevan scientist,
Jean Piaget, enabled him to generate a coherent
body of theory of intellectual growth in young
children; and this in turn has caused a revolution,
Copernican in its scope, in developmental cognitive
psychology, in curriculum planning, in pedagogy and
evaluation
.
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Consequently, any systematic inquiry in the realm of
value theory should begin by trying to answer the following
questions
:
What is a value? What is its origin?
What is the relationship between a value and a fact?
How many types of values are there?
Is there any hierarchy among them?
What is a value system?
How do values relate to knowing and the learning
process?
Is there any process involved in the formation of
values?
To what extent can a value or a value system be
modified?
Are there any universals in the system of values and
also in the process of value formation?
What is the relationship between values, attitudes
and beliefs and the process of self-actualization
of an individual?
What is the effect of a culture in value formation?
Can we evaluate the process of value formation?
Is there any ultimate criteria by which we can
validate value judgments?
The above considerations may be the heart of a value
theory for education since education is an arena in which
all possible ramifications of the concept of value are
involved. Ideally, a comprehensive theory of value will
have to include a set of propositions which explicate the
phenomenon of value formations and contain clear and
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unambiguous definitions of the terms involved and explain
the interrelationships that exist among them. Then one can
ask, "What do the answers to the above questions imply for
the educational process in general and to curriculum and
pedagogical theory in particular?
The goal for value theory, says Edel in a succinct
statement:
...is to . find
. the unity of value in the most
systematic, historical, evolutionary picture of
man from his emergence on the globe to the presentday, through the various stages of his development,
with whatever knowledge we have or can acquire ofhe appearance of the various value phenomena andprocess of valuation and evaluation, the changes inthese phenomena, the conditions (biological, psycho-logical, social and historical) of their appearance
and their change."
Edel goes on to say that formulation of such a theory
requires the
basic scope of a Darwin, the sense of internal
dynamics of a Freud, the historical sweep of a
Marx, the unifying penetration of a Bentham, the
logical-linguistic skill of a Carnap. Perhaps
I should add the sensitivity of a Dostoievski
and the moral feeling of a Ghandi, and tie them
all together with the intellectual energy of an
Aristotle. The conclusion may be that value
theory will be successfully carried out only to
the extent that it becomes the collective effort
of the spirit of philosophy in conjunction with
the body of science" (Edel, 1953).
One has but to survey the literature in social and
behavioral sciences that deal with value to be convinced
of the truth in the above statement.
Status of Literat.nrp
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in Value Inquiry
The literature in this area is voluminous, and at the
outset the task of defining the term "value" itself is
beset with ambiguity and vagueness. A bewildering profu-
sion of terms have been employed for defining the term
"value" ranging from what a person wants, desires, needs,
enjoys, and prefers through what he thinks desirable, re-
warding, and obligatory to what the community sanctions or
enforces. A few of the more popular definitions are
mentioned to demonstrate the great variety and looseness
of the terms employed (Baier, 1969, p. 33):
tnwaia g -!?
aS ° r iS a value and when people behaveo rd it so as to retain or increase their pos-
session of it (George Lundberg)
.
Anything capable of being appreciated (wished for)is a value (Robert Part and E. W. Burgess).
Values are the obverse of motives ... the object,
quaiity, or condition that satisfied the motivation(Richard T. LaPiere)
.
Values are any object of any need (Howard Becker).
A desideratum or anything desired or chosen by
someone, at sometime -- operationally: what the
respondent says he wants (Stuart C. Dodd).
(A value is) a conception, explicit or implicit,
distinctive of an individual or characteristic
of a group, of the desirable which influences
the . selection from available means and ends of
action (Clyde Kluckhohn)
.
’Values' are 'the desirable end states which act
as a guide to human endeavor or the most general
statements of legitimate ends which guide social
action' (Neil J. Smelser)
.
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For Skinner values have different connotations and
he writes:
As to value, so far I can see
way of describing what is eitheithe iong run remforcive to man"1961, p. 576)
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immediately or in
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In no field of human inquiry is there more semantic
confusion and inconsistency in terminology as those in the
field of value inquiry. Such confusion abounds because there
is a lack of an organized and scientific attempt to stand-
ardize and make clear the terminology used in the behavioral
and social sciences. Words which occur in every language,
while perfectly adequate for the purposes of every day
living, are not precise enough for making the subtle dis-
tinctions which are required in science and philosophy.
Precision in thought can be attained only if the terms
that are used are clear and the meanings of these terms have
been carefully and precisely defined. That such precision
in terminology is essential in a science becomes obvious
the moment one reflects upon the multitude of specific
symbols which have been developed, and which are required
for rigorous and abstract thinking, in the exact sciences
like physics and chemistry. In order to communicate system-
atic knowledge and to draw extended inferences, it is vital
that technical terms be used. For example, the concept
34
"H
2
0" has made possible formal inferences and the discovery
of complex relationships between substances which simply
could not have been reached through the use of the common
sense notion of the term "aqua" or "water." In spite of
diverse interests for a chemist, haematologist, microbiol-
ogist, and food processing technician, the term "pH" con-
notes one and only one thing -- "hydrogen ion concentra-
tion." The importance of technical symbols in the develop-
ment of science has been so critical that the emergence of
contemporary science and technology to such levels of ex-
cellence may in part be attributed to its development of a
systematic and precise set of symbols. Certainly, the
freedom of science from superstition and the gradual
emancipation of the applied sciences from subjective biases
leading to erroneous interpretations of phenomena, has
had one necessary condition, the organization of a common
and systematic set of terms. And, as it is frequently
pointed out by contemporary thinkers (Handy, 1964), one
of the major blocks to the present effectiveness of a
science of sociology, or science of psychology, or a
science of education, is the absence of that kind of a
"language" as employed in the exact sciences.
Since the matters which philosophy deals with are far
more complicated in their nature than those with which the
exact sciences are concerned, philosophy historically has
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had much greater difficulty in freeing itself from sub-
jective interpretations. And certainly, until very recently,
little attempt has been made to develop a common terminol-
ogy for philosophic thought. Some philosophers have tried
to develop a completely new symbolism for their inquiries,
in which the imprecision and ambiguity of the field of
philosophical discourse may be eliminated. Phenix writes
that an organized and pioneer effort in the direction was
made by Whitehead and Russell in their celebrated Principia
Mathematics
,
which tried to use special and precise mathe-
matical symbolism for expressing meta-meanings of philos-
ophy (Phenix, 1964, p. 255).
However, in order to have correct inference about
things, it is not enough merely to be precise in the
statement of the definition of terms. When meaning is
assigned to a term, it must not be given to it in an
arbitrary way. It is necessary that the meaning be made to
correspond to the characteristics of the object, event,
idea or concept that the term is supposed to represent.
Otherwise, there arises a cumbersome technical ’’jargon"
no matter how systematic it may appear to be at first
glance. Educational literature is particularly notorious
for having developed a pseudo- technical language in recent
years. Scarcely a month goes by without an article appear-
ing which ridicules "educationalists” for their use of a
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jargon that obscures and confuses rather than illuminates
the real issues. As Ducasse points out a systematic
knowledge is obtainable only to the degree that the terms
used in thinking are both precisely defined and defined
with a view to bringing a closer relationship to reality
(Ducasse, 1941).
Brewster Smith draws our attention to the conceptual
disarray of the definition of value in the social sciences
But the increased currency of explicit valueconcepts among psychologists and social scientistshas unfortunately not been accompanied by corres-
We"ta?V ^ conc®Ptua l clarity of consensus.lk about altogether too many probably dif-ferent things under one rubric when we stretchthe same
_ terminology to include the utilities of
mathematical decision theory..., fundamental
assumptions about the nature of the world and man'splace m it..., ultimate preferences among life
styles..., and core attitudes or sentiments that
set priorities among one’s preferences and thusgive structure to a life And, at the same
time, we are embarrassed with a proliferation of
concepts akin to values: attitudes and senti-
ments, but also interests, preferences, motives,
cathexes
,
valences. The handful of major attempts
to study values empirically have started from
different preconceptions and have altogether failed
to link together to yield a domain of cumulative
knowledge (Smith, 1969, p. 97).
Much of the confusion in value inquiry, writes Kluckhohn:
undoubtedly arises from the fact that one speaker
has the general category in mind, another a
particular limited type of value, still another a
different specific type. We have not discovered
any
. comprehensive classification of values.
Golightly has distinguished essential and
operational values; C. I. Lewis intrinsic, extrin-
sic, inherent, and instrumental values. The
Cornell group speaks of asserted and operating
values. Perry has discriminated values according
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Added to this are the divergent methods and purposes of
inquiry among the disciplines that are interested in the
study of values. Such a state of affairs by itself
necessitates some compelling theoretical basis for sug-
gesting a systematic classification of values.
The breadth and scope of the problem of value inquiry
is staggering because the issue of values occupies an
important position in all the social sciences -- sociology,
anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, political science,
education, economics, ethics and history. "Problems of
values," Robin Williams writes, "appear in all fields of
the social sciences and value elements are potentially
important as variables to be analyzed in all major areas
of investigation (Williams, 1968, p. 286). In each of the
areas, however, the concept of value receives a different
emphasis. For example, the specialist in ethics is con-
cerned with the meaning of the word "good." The psychol-
ogist's interest is in the laws of learning as they speak
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to the growth of habits and behavior of an individual. The
sociologist and the anthropologist may study value from the
standpoint of discovering and analyzing the aims, ideals,
and habits of various religious, cultural, national and
economic groups. Traditionally, educators are interested
in fostering aims and ideals and creating for the future
generation a system of attitudes and values.
The findings and interests of these areas of inquiry
need to be coordinated and harmonized into a general theory
of value for guidance in the decision-making process in an
educational system. Educators cannot wisely discharge their
responsibilities if they attempt to deal with major issues
in a piecemeal fashion. But without any broad frame of
reference there is no alternative. What is required is
therefore a comprehensive value theory.
The problem of axiology (science of values) is to
clarify the criteria or principles by which we determine
what is good in human conduct and action, what is beautiful
in art, and what is right in social action and the institu-
tions which foster them. The problem of axiology for
education is then to clarify the meaning of value and all
related terms, examine and integrate them as they apply to
the people who are to be served by educational institutions.
The complex nature of value phenomena demands an inter-
disciplinary approach to the formulation of a theory of
39
value if it is to be comprehensive. If i t i s t0 be
efficacious it should not only be well grounded in psych-
ology, sociology and anthropology, but must find its roots
in epistemological, ontological and axiological foundations
of human knowledge. A theory of value grounded in but one
area of study concerned with man is vulnerable; contribu-
tions from all are required.
The importance of researching the contributions of
the many areas of value inquiry in spite of their varied
interests and methodologies is not denied but what is
questioned is the adequacy of any one area of inquiry in
formulating a comprehensive value theory. The following
chapter will be devoted to reviewing some of the contribu-
tions of social scientists which may assume salience in
formulating the value theory of the ANISA Model.
CHAPTER III
VALUE THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The social sciences, Robert Redfield observes, "occupy
uneasy seats at the feast of learning between the physical
and biological sciences on their right and the humanities
on the left (Redfield, 1962). The uneasiness, in large
part, is traceable to one of their primary concerns - values.
While a physicist or a chemist does not have to worry about
what his "vector" or "DNA" wants, thinks and believes, it
is impossible for a sociologist or anthropologist to
investigate any social phenomena without considering the
nature of the values of a society or culture. A psych-
ologist is confronted with the same problem when he studies
individual personalities. Out of sheer necessity, the
empirical study of value phenomena has advanced much further
in the social sciences than in other disciplines.
Culture, society and the individual human personality
are major antecedents of values. Parsons has analyzed
human action to be a system that contains three mutually
irreducible subsystems, vi_s. the personality system, the
social system and the cultural system (Parsons, 1951). As
Morris recognizes, values play an important role in the
origin, maintenance and nature of these subsystems and
hence in human behavior as a whole (Morris, 1964). Thus
value can be seen as the integrator of the personality,
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social and cultural systems, and therefore, the integrator
of the human action system.
Social Psychologists and Value Theory
Needless to say, the foundations of a comprehensive
value theory that will have relevance for education as an
applied science, should be consistent with the psychological
theory of human behavior in general and the findings concern-
ing the dynamics of group interaction in particular. There
is growing recognition today among social scientists that
an adequate theory of values and morality will ultimately
rest on the conclusions of developmental social psychology
and psychotherapy.
Determinants of human behavior . The starting point
from which many contemporary social and behavioral scientists
begin a psychological study of man's growth and development,
individually and collectively as a member of a society, is
the value attributes of his behavior and experience that
differentiates him from any other creatures. For them all
values are rooted in human behaviors. There are many
determinants of human behavior and the viability of theories
advanced in this field depend upon the nature of the set of
assumptions about these determinants and their relation-
ships. For instance, the classical "Field Theory" of
Lewin in social psychology uses the term "vector" for the
forces which bear upon an individual as he makes a decision
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and acts. To understand value, the determinants of human
behavior, which are a part of an individual’s psychic make-
up and the environmental milieu (both social and cultural),
have to be identified and their influence on the resulting
behavior under a given circumstance thoroughly studied.
A determinant of behavior refers to an influence exerted
upon the person, predisposing him to act or behave in a
specified manner in response to a given situation. Scholars
in the field have identified (or have tentatively agreed
upon) at least three basic determinants involved; viz.,
belief, attitude (Jacobs and Flink, 1962).
A study that provides a simple and clear understand-
ing of the nexus between value and the above mentioned
basic determinants of human behavior is that of Milton
Rokeach (Rokeach, 1968, 1973). Rokeach’s identification
and definitions of the determinants of behavior and their
interrelationships are not only congruent with those of
Brewster Smith (1963) and Robin Williams (1968) but are
also parallel to the general framework for a unified social
theory outlined in the classical treatise of Parsons and
Shils (1951) and the monumental decade-long work of
Kluckhohn and his collaborators (1961)
,
thus bringing a
cross disciplinary validation of some significance to
Rokeach’s work.
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Rokeach' s Theory of Value
While empirically oriented, social psychologists over
the past few decades have been paying more attention to the
theoretical aspects of attitude and attitude measurements.
Rokeach, realizing the ripeness of the time to shift social
psychology's concern, put foreward a theory of value which
brings about some conceptual clarity in our understanding
of values and attitudes and their functional interconnec-
tions. His work also includes substantial empirical inves-
tigations to show that enduring changes in important atti-
tude and value systems are possible as a result of certain
educational procedures, other than persuasion or indoctrina-
tion (Rokeach, 1971).
He identifies three basic determinants in human
behavior: viz., beliefs, attitudes, and value; and his
theory throws some light on how values are formed.
Bel ie f s
. Every conscious human being has a certain
basic way of perceiving things for himself, i.e., to
make some sense out of the physical and social world in
terms of its structure and operation. These perceptions
and personal inferences (which may be true or false,
objective or subjective, conscious or unconscious) con-
stitute the basis of a belief. Every person has thousands
of beliefs about the world around him, and these beliefs
are among the basic determinants of behavior. A belief
44
system represents the total universe of a person's beliefs
about the physical world, social world and the self
(Rokeach, 1960).
—
itUd6S : Personal beliefs are often very transient.
As an individual grows, they become modified; but at any
one time, a relatively stable cluster of beliefs or an
enduring organization of beliefs are formed around an ob-
ject, event, or an idea which predisposes the individual to
behave in some manner. Like nucleotides 1 in a biological
system, the beliefs become organized into a well-defined
pattern or a system having definite observable behavioral
consequences. These relatively enduring clusters of
beliefs are called ATTITUDES and become hierarchically im-
portant behavioral determinants -- important because they
are stabler than the basic determinant belief or belief
system. According to Rokeach, attitudes, which can be
learned, have definite cognitive and affective components
which reinforce each other. Besides they also have an
evaluative component. An attitude is an integrated belief
system but not all beliefs are differentiated aspects of
an attitude. For instance, when an attitude is formed
1. Nucleotides are the basic biochemical building blocks
of the nucleic acid molecule, like RNA and DNA of the
biological system.
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about an entity, not all the beliefs about that entity take
part in forming the relatively durable structure. For
Rokeach, since an attitude has an evaluative component,
it leads to a preferential response or behavior. A person,
he says, "is predisposed selectively to perceive, recognize
judge, interpret, feel, learn, recall, or think in ways
congruent with his attitude" (Rokeach, 1968, p. 122). Or,
in other words, attitudes mediate purposive behavior
.
Values: Clusters of integrated attitudes form values;
they are the main determinants of behavior in any situation
Values elicit two types of results; preferable types of
behavior and preferable types of terminal goals. When we
say that a person has a "value," it is to say that he has
a pattern of relatively enduring clusters of beliefs
(attitudes) which says to him that a particular type of
behavior or a particular goal is preferable to alternative
ways and goals. Value for Rokeach is a more dynamic con-
cept which has strong volitional components as well as
affective and cognitive components.
Boiling all these down to a succinct theoretical state
ment, Rokeach writes, "values are guides and determinants
of social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and of
social behavior on the other (Rokeach, 1973, p. 24).
Value System : Once a value has been internalized,
it becomes a conscious or unconscious criterion for guiding
action and for evaluating the actions of one's own self or
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the actions of others. Rokeach observes ( 1968
, p. 160 )
that this definition of belief, attitude, value -- the
trinity of human behavioral determinants is completely com-
patible with the one advanced by others like Kluckhohn,
Smith and Williams. The distinction made between preferable
modes of behavior and final goals of actions classifies
values as instrumental and terminal respectively.
A person’s value system is defined as a learned or
acquired organization of rules (basic values) for making
choices and for resolving conflicts between modes of be-
havior and goals of actions. People are often confronted
with a problem or conflict situation which they cannot
resolve because they cannot behave in a manner congruent
with all their values. One value may be pitted against
another. They may have to decide whether the mode of
behavior or the goal of their actions is preferable and
this depends upon the contending rules of the hierarchy
forming the clusters of their values that make up their
value system. A person's total hierarchy of values is,
then, called a value system. A person's total value system
may contain thousands of beliefs, hundreds of attitudes, a
few dozen values. It follows from this that any change in
one part of the system, if prolonged, will change the parts
connected to it thus leading to a behavioral change or a
goal shift. Attitudes and values, whether instrumental
or terminal, are always cognitively and affectively
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interrelated. When the value system is internally con-
sistent, it will be the chief determinant of a person’s
behavior and goal in life. The total personality of a
person thus depends upon how his value system is consistent
and close to reality. The theory has ramifications for
incorporation into the comprehensive value theory of the
ANISA Model, which will be discussed in a later section.
Cultural Anthropologists and Value Inquiry
Values pervade the culture of every society in the
sense that the conduct of any individual in the culture
is always subject to the value system of society. Any
attempt to define behavior and education without reference
to cultural contexts becomes meaningless. Every society
strives to make its newborn behave according to the society’s
"norms.” The process of encul turation (transmission of
knowledge, values, beliefs, attitudes, habits, laws and
customs acquired by man as a member of that society) is
supported by specialized agencies and institutions of
the society; the school is probably one of the most influ-
ential agencies outside the home and family. Throughout
the ages, the first and foremost task of education has been
that of transmitting, expanding and in some cases refining
the great values in each culture. Occasionally every cul-
ture becomes conscious of itself and questions critically
its own weaknesses and strengths. In a given culture there
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may be many schools of thought each based on a different
perspective on the process of "enculturation." These per-
spectives have one distinguishing common feature; they
agree that "culture is the fulcrum of an effort to inter-
pret the meaning of man, his existence and his actions”
(Brameld, 1971). But since each culture has its own value
system, the outcome of the effort will be different in each
case
.
Value Systems and Cultural Universals
. The contribu-
tions of cultural anthropologists may be of great rele-
vance to value theory for anthropologists have always been
interested in questions concerning values: Can any value
system be considered as universal, if not basically absolute?
Are all values inherently relative and is it futile to
search for pan-human relations and values? Have we any
reason to assume that the values that have emerged out of
any given culture have any objectivity superior to those
which have emerged from another? Is there any possibility
of transcending the ethnocentric predicament in the making
of value judgments? Can there be culture-free cues and
evaluation? (Kluckhohn, 1953.)
Anthropologists, according to Linton, have consis-
tently avoided judgments regarding what things are univers-
ally desired or valued in the final analysis. Their
principal contribution to date has been the development of
the concept of cultural relativity. Through cross-cultural
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studies, they have been able to demonstrate that different
societies have successfully achieved the same ends by
employing different means, and all of them prize and desire
certain values and are willing to work together to achieve
them. "In broad general terms," says Linton, "a value can
be defined as something that has the capacity to influence
an individual’s decisions in choice situations or going
one step further back, anything capable of producing an
emotional response" (Linton, 1954). Under this there are,
of course, individual values as well as those which are
cultural, i.e., shared and transmitted by the members of a
particular society. However, in a search for universals,
the individual values may be ignored. They are transitory
like the persons who have them and may have influence on
the socio- cultural continuum only when they come to be
shared by other individuals. In all cultures there are
events, objects, and concepts toward which members of the
society have strong attitudes. In certain cases, members
of a society will work as hard to avoid certain things as
they will to win other things. Generally, in anthropolog-
ical studies, the single term "value" is substituted for a
more precise term, "value- attitude system." Within the
definition of this term a value may be regarded as anything
toward which the members of a society normally have a
definite attitude, whether favorable or unfavorable.
Values are an integral part of any society’s culture
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and with regard to their historical origin, transmission
and integration, they follow the same rules as any other
element of culture. A normal society consists of a well-
organized, self-perpetuating group of individuals which
persists far beyond the life-span of any one of its com-
ponent members. Its persistence is made possible by the
presence of a culture, i.e., an organized body of ideas
and behavior patterns which are transmitted from generation
to generation within the society by learning. The culture
as a whole provides techniques by which the members of
the society can both satisfy their individual needs while
cooperating toward the achievement of common ends.
All societies and cultures are constantly in a state
of flux and internal readjustment. Individuals develop
new solutions to old problems, new patterns of thought and
behavior emerge as a result of progressive leaps into novel
and creative ways of dealing with the changing environment.
These changes may produce disharmonies in the culture
which will create tensions and pressures on the individual
who must find new ways to adjust. In this situation of
constant flux, the society’s main guide in facing new
situations and in deciding which of the new patterns of
thought and behavior should be accepted and integrated into
the 'culture is the society’s system of values . At the same
time it is this system that also guides the member's course
of action in any new situation amongst possible alternatives
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v.hich are always presented at a given time. In both cul-
tures and individuals, there is always some divergence
between personal values and value systems of the culture;
the degree of divergence may usually be taken as an index
of a person's psychological or social stability.
Cultural and social anthropology is to the community,
what psychology is to the individual. Anthropologists are
concerned with the dispassionate analysis and observation
aimed at discovering the deeply rooted subconscious motives
that determine collective behavior patterns of integrated
societies. Psychologists find that there is a universal
need for social dependency in which the interactive person
finds the meaning for his life in his relations with others.
Just as the psychologically dependent infant would die, the
socially dependent adult falls into apathy which may lead
into psychological death. Eric Fromm, coming from another
discipline, has put it,
Unless the person feels that he belongs some-
where, unless his life has some meaning and
direction, he would feel like a particle of dust
and be overcome by his individual insignificance.
He would not be able to relate himself to any
system which would have meaning and direction
to his life, he would be filled with doubt and
his doubt eventually would paralyze his ability
to act or to live (Fromm, 1941, p. 21-22).
It may be a fitting conclusion to end this section with
a relevant observation by Kluckhohn:
that L^hronn?
d and
f
urest generalizations
anthropology can make about human beings isthat no society is healthy or creative or strong
*he society has a set of common values
g
hich give it meaning and purpose to group lifewhich can be symbolically expressed, which fit withthe situation of the time as well as being linked tothe historic past which does not outrage men’s
reason and which at the same time appeals to theiremotions (Kluckhohn, 1952a, p. 112).
CHAPTER IV
TOWARD A SCIENCE OF VALUE
Philosophers throughout the ages have attempted to
discover a common core in value phenomena by deriving values
from the essential structure of being. This ontological
approach to formulate a science of value with the purpose
of generating a unified concept of value based on a
generic sense of the term is often referred to as 'axiology .' 1
Hartman * s Axiology
Robert Hartman's contributions in the realm of value
inquiry and value judgments take us in an entirely dif-
ferent direction. The "Science of Value" elaborated by him
may provide the key to future realms of knowledge needed to
tackle many controversial issues in the study of values.
Robert Hartman's axiology as Weisskopf contends "comes very
near to the derivation of values from the essence of things"
(1959, p. 217). Rather than attempting to fully expound
his decade-long contribution to axiology, I shall briefly
enumerate the key concepts of his axiology that are the
prerequisites for an in-depth understanding of his system,
the educational implications of which have yet to be explored.
1. Nicholai Hartman (1932) of the Austro-German school,
Wilbur Urban (1941) of the United States and George
Moore (1903) of England can be regarded as the founding
fathers of modern axiology.
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Hartman's contributions lie in his attempt to build
the foundation of a systematic theory of value and in
leading his readers to some orderly thinking about the
realm of value. For him, axiology is to ethics, aesthetics,
economics, sociology, anthropology, education and politics,
what mathematics is to chemistry, physics, biology and
other natural and applied sciences. Axiology is a frame-
work for explicating the value phenomenon. Like mathematics,
it has its own axioms, definitions, rules of reduction; its
own dimensions, parameters, and scale of measurements.
In all his publications, Hartman shows a close
parallel between mathematics and his axiology, even as to
their recent origins. Just as Newton's Principia Mathematica
was the beginning and basis for all modern sciences, in the
estimation of Hartman, Moore's Principia Ethica may be the
mother book" of axiology. The crux in understanding Hart-
man's thesis lies in having a very clear notion of Moore's
idea of "Good." To give a brief historical perspective,
Hartman's starting point was the logical analysis of the
following sentence from Moore's book: "Good is good and
that's the end of the matter" (Moore, 1903). It seems that
Moore could not define his own term and he evaded defining
it in his book, just as physicists found it impossible to
measure the vector of a sub-atomic particle but still went
on building theories of atomic and particle physics. It
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'.-as not until 40 years later that Moore formulated the two
following propositions, elaborating on his previous worh.
1-
anything?"
iS 3 n3tUral P roPertT of
2. • • though^ this is so it depends entireiv 2the natural properties' of that which has^it?" 3
But again, Moore could not spell out in which way "it
defends." Hartman's "formal axiology" begins from this state
of Moore's bewilderment and "sets in and defines exactly
the nature of this depending " (Hartman 1959).
The fundamental axiom of value science
. Hartman's
clarification of the meaning of Moore's two propositions
was the critical step in developing his axiology. He
reformulated them in the following way, thus throwing light
on the nature of the " depending
.
M
(a) Goodness is a property not of objects basicallybut of concepts
.
’
(b) An object's goodness depends upon whether it is
what or as_ it is supposed to be.
Equating goodness" with "value" in the above propo-
sitions, one obtains what is called the "fundamental axiom"
2. Emphasis mine.
3. "It" meaning goodness.
in Hartman's axiology, or his definition of the idea of
value
.
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At this stage an example is needed to explain this
axiom from which flows theorems and corrolaries of Hartman's
axiology. Let us examine the following propositions.
A. The University of Massachusetts is good if itis what it is supposed to be.
B. The University of Massachusetts is good if it1S as 1 b is supposed to be.
Extrinsic goodness
. The statement "A" describes func-
tionally the attributes of UMass., i.e., it is good because
it has functionally all the attributes of a university
an educational institution which is providing facilities
for promoting education. Or, in other words, it has all the
attributes or concepts of the class -- university, to which
it belongs. This goodness by virtue of its belonging to a
class and fulfilling all the attributes of the class is
extensional goodness, also called EXTRINSIC GOODNESS, inasmuch
as it refers to a relation between the qualities of UMass.
and the qualifications of a university. It is evident
that the relation between a member of a class and the class
to which it belongs is the commonness of their attributes.
By putting "what it is supposed to be" in statement "A" we
are actually asking to what class UMass. is supposed to
belong, given the attributes.
UMass. becomes a good university if it has all the
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attributes of universities
is good or valuable if it
of the class it belongs to
good when it fulfills the
goodness as we see is not
goodness, as Hartman puts
. It follows, then, that "anything
has all the attributes or concepts
or in other words, a thing is
definition of its concept. This
ethical goodness but axiological
it
.
Intrinsic goodness. When we come to the statement
B which is that "UMass. is good if it is as it is supposed
to be," the goodness here refers not with respect to having
all the attributes of a class but as UMass. itself is
supposed to be, i.e., its goodness depends upon, not only
its membership in the Class of University, but on itself
-- on its being as it was intended to be in the first place
when it was established. The intention refers to its own
particular criteria for being a good university, e.g., its
aims and the quality of education it desired to provide.
This kind of goodness is called intentional goodness or
INTRINSIC GOODNESS. This goodness has uniqueness because
no other university can be exactly like UMass. under this
condition. Thus, Hartman defines two kinds of goodness or
values in his axiology.
While elaborating on the importance of this axiom
of axiology, he once again shows the parallel between
axiology and mathematics. The key to understanding the
science of value lies in the recognition of the fact that
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the value of anything applies
of the objects and not to the
1967)
.
only to concepts or attributes
objects themselves (Hartman,
Implications of Hartman's »in. There are a number
of important implications issuing from Hartman's axiom:
1. The axiom itself throws light on a multitude of problems
which have plagued value theory for 2,000 years, such as:
(a) the relationship between fact and value;
(b) the absoluteness or relativity of value;
(c) the objectivity and subjectivity of value;
(d) the nature of goodness and badness of the
world (Hartman, 1959).
2. The axiom deals with dimensions of value which have a
certain hierarchy. Any entity can be valued in three di-
mensions called systemic value, extrinsic value and intrinsic
value according to the degree it fulfills the definition of
its concept and depending upon the frame of reference; e.g.,
we love mankind systemically
,
our next door neighbor extrin-
sically
,
and our life partners intrinsically. Usually,
values grow from systemic to extrinsic to intrinsic.
3. The relationship between the actual and the ideal in
any entity is also explained by the axiom. When the axiom
is applied to an individual, it explains his structure.
A person is systemically good (or valuable) because of his
being a part of mankind, his species, and having all the
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attributes and contributing to the collective life of man-
kind. He is extrins ically good when he fulfills the expec-
tations as a member of a particular class -- a teacher,
administrator, doctor or farmer. A person is intrinsically
good as a doctor when he is as good as his conscience as a
doctor demands. Or, in other words, a person is good if
he follows his conscience to become what he himself has set
to become, i.e., when he attempts to fulfill his subjective
aim or purpose in life. Thus conscience is an intrinsic
4
value
.
One of the educational implications of Hartman's pro-
positions is that a "sense of values" depends on knowing
the attributes that define a particular class and on knowing
how something is "supposed to be" -- i.e., standards of
excellence and quality, etc.
4. This raises another point. According to Hartman's
value theory, a master thief is a good thief if he
steals well and is a perfectionist. In terms of his
own aim, though it may be detrimental to the collective
security of the population around him, the thief is
"good" axiologically.
CHAPTER V
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF VALUE
From the point of view of educational practice, the
present status of value theory is analogous to that of the
theory of knowledge or learning at the beginning of this
century. Each discipline has made its own contribution
without any preconceived plan or pattern of inquiry as to
which aspect of value it should investigate, and yet these
studies show the many important dimensions of value. To
demonstrate how they all seem to fall into place will be
the task of a comprehensive value theory.
Perspectives From Current Theories
There is a relative ubiquity of the value-attitude con-
cept across disciplines. Attitudes seem to be the special
concern of psychologists and sociologists while values and
value systems have long been a central attraction to social
or cultural anthropologists. These disciplines share a
common concern with the antecedents and consequences of
value organization. None of the theories discussed here
touches directly on the relevance or application to educa-
tional theory or practice though they are implied in each
of them.
Sociology was defined by Max Weber as "that science
which aims at the interpretive understanding of social
behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes,
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its source and its effects" (Weber, 1962). Identifying
value as the chief determinant of social behavior of an
individual m actual life situations, the social psychol-
ogist, Milton Rokeach, provides a reasonably clear notion
of his model -- a person-centered theory, outlining the
mechanisms involved in the formation of values and organi-
zation of an individual’s value system. Values determine
behavior and Rokeach (1973, p. 211, 338) holds that value
change leads to attitudinal and behavior modification.
Values are implicated as dependent or independent variables
at virtually all levels of social function -- cultural,
institutional, group and individual. Since the life process
depends on the selection or rejection of certain aspects
of the environment, the preferential behavior -- the positive
or negative orientation toward an object, idea or event --
is a basic phenomenon of life. For Rokeach, true to the
tradition of a social psychologist, the study of prefer-
ential behavior constitutes the science of value.
This view may lead one to infer that Rokeach’
s
theoretical persuasion is not far removed from that of
B. F. Skinner who views values in a different light when
compared to social psychologists. 1 For Rokeach value is a
1. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity
,
Skinner argues "that the
reinforcing effects of things are the province of
behavioral science, which, to the extent it is con-
cerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of
values" (Skinner
,
1971, p. 104). Skinner concedes
value to be at the most a by-product.
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more dynamic concept and has a strong motivational component
as well as cognitive, affective behavioral components.
Values that are internalized as a result of cultural, societal
and personal experience are more or less psychological
structures that in turn have consequences of their own.
Values, as Rokeach rightly comments, serve a "self-actualiz-
ing function" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 25). They also represent
what has been actualized.
A value theory like that of Rokeach (which considers
values as determinants of behavior and explains the change
and the mode of change of behavioral determinants) has yet
to account for the much needed vital relationship between
its position on development of the person’s "value system"
and the "value system" of the theory of cultural dynamics
as it is emerging from contemporary anthropological research.
Anthropologists have shown the importance of a value
system for a culture or a society’s stability and viability.
But all cultures do not appear equally stable and therefore
to hold that values, value systems, and value judgments of
all societies are equally valid and relative to the society
in which such judgments are made is a rather naive and weak
theoretical position. The proof of this lies in the fact
that in important matters, men do not act on this theory.
They always look for an objective basis for value. While
the concept of cultural relativism frees the mind of the
observer from errors of ethnocentric biases, it makes, as
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Fried observes, exceptionally difficult, perhaps even im-
possible, the task of scientifically analyzing and compar-
ing cultures and their values systems (Fried, 1964, p. i 64 ) .
Value systems and value judgments, as Benedict con-
cludes, are expressions of the total pattern of culture
(Benedict, 1934). Members of different societies start from
different premises for validating their judgments, and
therefore, there is no basis for argument that does not beg
the question. It is in this area, anthropologists find,
that disagreement seems most frequent and often irremedial
(Wellman, 1963) . Since there are no universally accepted
premises, no universal validity is possible. A theory
which holds that all values are relative is a protective
one, in fact, even a permissive one. It only justifies
our resistance to aggressive people who insist on their own
value scheme as final. But it does not enable us to com-
bine forces and rally men to take a firm stand against
injustice, cruelty, exploitation, prejudice, or any other
undesirable state of affairs. This position was probably
tenable when societies and cultures were isolated and
ethical standards of one culture in no way affected detri-
mentally the way of life of the other cultures. This is
untenable in this era where ecologists have realized the
2
wisdom in the old Vedic saying "Even the dropping of a
dry leaf from a tree has its own effect on the universe.'*
2. Vedas are the sacred scriptures of the Hindus.
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As Hocking remarks (probably dogmatically):
?
f strange shallowness of recentn life that it should be deemed a conceit torecogn'ze an absolute, and a humility to cSnside^11 standards relative, where as it is preciselyhe reverse: it is only the absolute that dulyrebukes our pride (Hocking, 1959, p. 166).
7
No sound axiological theory can develop on the basis
of current assumptions of anthropology and sociology in
respect of the relativism of values in different societies
and cultures, unless there is a sound basis for validating
the value system at another level of human reality.
Hartman has given us a logical (axiological) definition
of value and a reasonable concept of conscience, but his
system needs an exogenous reference system on the basis
of which his term "as it is supposed to be" can be given
true meaning. No doubt his system appreciates the need for
realizing the expositional properties or purpose of an
entity (a concept not so popular until recently in the world
of behavioral scientists)
,
but again one can go on endlessly
disputing what "as it is supposed to be" is. In this regard
Hartman's attempt "stumbles on the lack of a theoretical
stance" from which one can select the relevant sets of
properties intrinsic to the entity (Welty, 1970) . As
explained earlier, according to Hartman's value theory, a
master thief is a good thief for he steals well and is a
perfectionist in his technique. In terms of his own aim,
though it may be detrimental to the collective security of
the society around him, the thief is "good" axiologically.
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To brand this robber as a moral degenerate, one would need
an external standard as a reference point which will
articulate the individual's true purpose and goal in life.
It is natural that any axiological judgment would differ
from person to person because of one's ignorance or non-
acceptance of the purpose of an entity (or the expositional
properties of the thing) under consideration. This serious
deficiency of Hartman's axiology is alluded to by Robert
Mueller in his criticism of Hartman:
Hartman
' s system is neat, clean and mathematically
and logically unassailable as long as it remainsin its tower. But the consequences of its descentinto the real world are disas terous
. . . . But this
is not to say that Hartman's work could not be usedin conjunction with other systems to form some sort
of value study or test. In particular, since the
test depends for its validity on the system's ability
to determine value in things themselves (expositional
properties of things) and since in the present system,
this ability is lacking, some other criterion would
have to be invoked; but once invoked, there is no
apparent reason why a real system and test might not
develop (Mueller, 1969).
Emergence of Values in the Process of Man's Becoming
The ANISA theory of development which explains the
nature of man's becoming as the processes of actualizing his
innate potential, identifies five basic categories of psych-
ological potentialities. When these potentialities 4 are
3. Parenthetical phrase is mine.
4. Potentiality comes from a Latin word and connotes
"latent power."
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actualized through the interaction with the environment,
they become power or energy ("effectance" to use Robert
White's term [1959]) to the becoming man which enables him
to interact further to increase his effectance. Like all
orms of energy, which are available only in quanta, the
actualized potentialities form enduring quanta, or aggre-
gates, or structures which predisposes the interacting
organism to respond in a specified way to some aspect of
an environment.
The actualized potentialities are not random expressions
of energy utilization. The expressions are patterned; these
patterns, when they are relatively enduring, are called value
in the ANISA theory. Presumably these patterns are the
result of (functioning) structures which are formulated (in
the brain) as a consequence of interaction with the environ-
ment. The formulation of these structures is what is meant
by the term learning; learning competence means developing
structures which enable one to understand what to do to
establish other structures that are wanted as efficiently
as possible. Thus learning competence is the fundamental
expression of transcendence.
Actualization of potentialities does not take place
in a vacuum and interaction with all aspects of the environ-
ment -- micro to the macrocosmic -- are inextricably involved
in the process. Thus value formation is the structuring of
potentialities from all categories, viz., psycho-motor,
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perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional, fused with
information about the environment. Since the fusion includes
volitional elements, values always have an evaluative or
decision-making constituent which has implications for
increasing effectance. Thus the emergence of values is the
process of becoming. Values predispose the organism to
respond or behave in a certain way in relationship to some
aspect of the environment usually in terms of a purpose,
and as Rokeach observes, guides human action and is a deter-
minant in behavior. Values are indispensable outcomes of
the process of becoming; they are reflected in all thoughts,
relations and activities no matter what man thinks or
believes or how he responds to his fellow men, society, him-
self and the cosmos. They are either subjective, laden with
feelings, or objective and rational. They are embodied
in all man's interpersonal relations, goals, and behavior.
A value system is composed of all the values usually inte-
grated around aims, purposes or ultimate concerns.
The patterns in the use of the energy available to the
organism as a result of structuring of the 'actualized
potential' and the ends to which the energy is used by an
individual defines the self and constitutes the structure
of personality or identity (Kalinowski and Jordan, 1973).
A considerable number of clinical findings which reveal
the principles of normalcy, growth and maturation of psycho-
logically healthy individuals and evolution of their value
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structures have been gathered and coordinated by several
psychologists such as Maslow (1962) and Fromm (1955).
Shoeben gives the following criteria for normalcy: "Self-
control, personal responsibility, social responsibility,
democratic social interest and ideals" (Shoeben, 1957).
Concepts of "adjustment," "integration," "mental health or
happiness" and "self-actualization" in clinical psychology
can become relevant only in a unified frame of reference
pertinent to patterns of structuring of energy and its use
as articulated by ANISA's value theory. Maslow has made
this abundantly clear by stating that the right sort of
psychotherapy is relevant to the search for values. He
observes
:
I think it is possible that we may soon even
define therapy as a search for values, because
ultimately the search for identity is, in
essence, the search for one's own intrinsic
values (Maslow, 1962, p. 166).
Problems of personality maladjustment, growth and develop-
ment cannot be adequately interpreted except in terms of
a coherent and orderly use of the energy as the actualized
potential of man is structured.
The identity of man -- the patterns of his use of the
quanta of energy -- depends to a large extent upon the
society in which he has been brought up. How values --
structured 'actualized potential' -- differ according to
the cultural and social milieu of the growing human being
can be easily visualized when one ponders the effect of
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encul turation seen in such diverse types as the English
aristocrat, the Australian Bushman, the Hollywood 'model,*
and the Indian Yogi, all of which leaves one wondering if
there is anything basic or universal underlying the forma-
tion of values. Personality is primarily a social product
and since societies are in a state of flux, there is a
continual reconfiguration in the value system (i.e., re-
structuring of the actualized potential) from early child-
hood to old age, depending on the quality of the inter-
action between the individual and the environment. There
is, moreover, a reciprocal relationship, a relation of
mutual reinforcement between the two -- the personality of
the individual and the structure of the social environment.
No arbitrary change in the individual's value system will
suddenly alter the personalities in the social system as a
whole in a desired direction.
Determinants in Structuring of Actualized Potentiality
There are many factors that guide or influence the
dynamics of structuring of the use of energy as human poten-
tialities are actualized. It would be the role of a compre-
hensive value theory to identify and speculate on the nature
of the forces which will either be confirmed or disproved
on the basis of further empirical evidence. While it would
be virtually impossible to study these factors in any
absolute way, one important factor which has been empirically
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validated is the nature of the information about the environ-
ment which the person has. This is a pre-eminent force
since, information about the environment (the physical, human
or unknown) is always fused with the process of actualization
to form values. This information about the environment
comes in the form of organized and classified knowledge of
man's accumulated past (immanence of the culture) present
and future. While the actualization of the potentialities
in man cannot be understood apart from his inner pressure
and propensity to become, the structuring of the actualized
potentials form values and is guided in the ultimate analysis,
by the subjective aims, purposes, or "lure" from the environ-
ment. These aims and purposes, either of the developing
individual, or of the society,' or both, in turn become the
determinants of human behavior. The behavioral and social
sciences define these as preferences, needs and goals. 6 The
disciplines in humanities define them as "oughts." With
proper use of energy (values) man can delay his satisfactions.
5. Patterned expressions of these aims and purposes can
be termed as ideals.
6. The "ideational, idealistic and sensate values" of
Sorokin (1941) refer to the quality of the lure that
guide the structuring of the actualized potential
of the society as a whole, while Maslow’s (1959)
"hierarchy of values" in his theory of motivation
and personality refer to the needs, aims, and purposes
that structure the energy of the individual.
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fix his mind and behavior to distant and unrealized goals,
strivings and ideals. Thus a value-ideal relationship is
rather reciprocal, one reinforcing the other. Any priori-
tization of needs, aims, and purposes consequently gives
rise to a hierarchy in value and value systems and will be
reflected in corresponding changes in behavior.
Validation of Aims and Purposes
Values and value systems are viable only to the extent
that the needs, aims and purposes that serve as lure for
the structuring of the actualized potential, are objectively
validated. Needless to emphasize that the efficacy and
coherence of a comprehensive theory of value, irrespective
of the discipline that formulates it, hinges on this criteria
of objective validation, as has already been shown in the
case of Hartman’s axiology and the value inquiry of cultural
anthropologists. One must appeal to some basis of objective
validity or argue in a circle.
The various behavioral sciences have performed a
valuable service in describing the factors and conditions
that shape human behavior. Even if the social sciences
discover in detail the various patterns of behavior which
reflect certain values derived from specific aims and
purposes, it does not necessarily mean that these values
ought to be the ethically right ones toward which human
behavior is aimed. As Margenau contends:
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We have practically no conceptual guidelines within
the framework of a value theory in educational practice
for assessing the extent to which the determinants of
human behavior, e.g., attitude, value, value system, aim,
purpose, and consequently human behavior itself, has objective
validity. Each mode of behavior may be judged as the cor-
rect one on its own right. Even if we contend that the
ethical or axiological correctness of a behavior or the
appropriateness of an aim or purpose (chosen to be the lure
for structuring the actualized potential) may be judged by
the consequences it engenders, then we have to be able to
evaluate the worth of the consequences and the objective
structure of worth has to come from some other source. Values,
along with their antecedents and consequents, should obtain
the ultimate validation from some other dimension of human
reality. It would be wrong to assume that to desire a
particular consequence is itself wrong, for what is worthy
and what is desired, may often coincide. The essential
idea is that distinction must be made between values
structured by lures that happen to be mere interests, needs
and desires and those based on goals and purposes which
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have objective worth based on human realities. There is a
decisive difference between wanting something and affirming
its worth.
If what is worth or good is defined as what gives
satisfaction, pleasure or success, and when we act on that
axiom we commit a blunder which Moore called the "naturalistic
fallacy” of identifying fact with value. To avoid this
blunder, the meaning of desirable and worthy consequences
or goals must be interpreted as an IDEAL. It means a state
of affairs that is worth bringing into existence and to be
devoutly hoped for. An ideal may be defined here as "not an
actuality, not a fact, a possibility that ought to be
realized, a potentiality it is desirable to actualize” (Phenix,
1964, p. 230)
.
Objective validity in value inquiry requires an ideal
or set of ideals to serve as standards of references, for
ideals make absolute demands in both thought and action.
Nexus between ideals and values . Ideals constantly
remould the patterns of human values (patterned of expres-
sion of energy - the structure of actualized potential)
.
Ideals themselves are constantly rethought and refashioned
as they necessarily remake man and society through new value
orientations, new appraisal of social roles and moral relations.
This demands imagination of the highest order backed by
constant readiness for fresh scrutiny and criticism of values.
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Such practical use of an ideal as a goad, according to
Mitchell (1925), corresponds to the analytical method in
logic and mathematics. An ideal is a mental construct
embodying a situation which, if actualized, would mean the
solution of the problem. Just as a hypothesis is a mental
construct in which facts find their explanation, the ideal
is a mental construct in which subjective aims, needs, and
purposes find their fulfillment. Ideals integrate elements
of values at various dimensions and are the life and sub-
stance of the healthy individual. As Bonner puts it:
"Without ideals man is not fully human, for the
and a
C
r °f.
hum“ness ls the capacity to envision
actualize ideal ends." (Bonner, 1965, p. 7.)
As Mukherjee writes:
The ideal is a gestalt
,
a holistic entity, It cuts
across the biological, the social and the metaphysicaldimensions of human living and reconciles and inte-grates the polarities and contradictions involved
there in. As it creates new values and coordinates
and transforms new values in a new dimensional setting
and through a new dialectic, it refines and reframes
a new situation, carrying with it deeper ego~involve -
ment, higher moral commitment and fresher intellectual
outlook. (Mukherjee, 1964, p. 93 .)
Ideals as working hypothesis in value theory . Many
moral philosophers have tried to develop a system of
objective validity in questions of ethics from simple
postulates concerning human goals and ideals. The telling
characteristic of all such endeavor says Margenau is that
"by themselves they remain ineffective" and goes on to add:
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... the scientificprocess is successful when the particular inferencesfa system agree with protocol experiences. Theethical process is successful when actual behavior
agrees with ideal protocol behavior. In the former
oase, scientific theory is verified; in the later,
ethical norms are validated (Margenau, 1969, p. 169).
The importance of using desired goals and ideals as
objective standards for validation of values is emphasized
also by Mukherjee:
It will be of immense advantage for social science
to envisage carefully defined and controlled goals,
standards and ideals, and then reach back from the
complete ideal to the necessary social conditions
and the intermediate means. The way will then be
prepared for bringing into existence the necessary
social conditions and to furnish the means for the
realization of the ideal by desirable changes....
Ideals, accordingly, are the working hypotheses of
the social sciences, frames of reference, that guide
and regulate goals and behavior as integral parts of
a universal and unlimited frame (Mukherjee, 1964,
p . 94)
.
There may be doubts if we can ever validate in any objec-
tive way (by use of methods similar to the natural sciences)
the significance and goals of human action and ideals which
appear to be so intensively personal. However, current
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rethinking in the methods of scientific inquiry 7 allows for
a new paradigm for scientific inquiry, more liberal than
ever before, m that it allows the inquiry "to harbor certain
ideals, non-empirical concerns regarding its product" (Mar-
genau, 1969).
The position taken here is that for educational pur-
poses and psychological health of the individual and the
societies around the world, we need a new accent on values
that transcends human wants and that any value laden enter-
prise, like education for example, makes sense only when
there are, as Phenix succinctly puts it, "objective ex-
cellences that invite the loyalties of men and constitute
the standard and goals of human endeavor" (Phenix, 1961,
p. 5). It is not my intent to claim that we all know what
ultimate good is, nor is it that it is possible to have con-
gruency of opinions universally on ethical questions and
value judgments. But it is my intent to speculate that
any serious concern to find out and act on what is right
rests on the convictions derived from transcendent ideals
-- objective standards of worth upon which universal
7. There are certain metaphysical requirements which
the basic constructs of any field of scientific
inquiry must fulfill in order to become genuine
elements of a theoretical science; criteria such
as internal logical consistency "fertility,
simplicity and elegance" in their formulation are
as important as the ability to generate empirically
verifiable hypothesis (Margenau, 1950, pp. 75-101).
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agreement, at least in principle, is possible.
The term ideal is used here in a very broad sense to
cover beliefs, values, goals, purposes, and aims, scientific
moral or spiritual. Ideals are real phenomena and are part
’
of man’s psycho- social equipment. Before new factual know-
ledge can become effective, it must be organized, incor-
porated with or related to an ideal. Ideals grow out of
our experiences, as patterns of the way we structure our
unknowns in the environment -- physical, human and unknown
and may differ a great deal in what may be called their
scientific or objective validation. Whether validated or
not by any method, ideals can still exert strong psycho-
social effects: for instance, the ideal of "civil dis-
obedience" of Mahatma Ghandi or Martin Luther King, Jr.
But in the long run only those ideals will prevail which are
scientifically validated and are backed by well established
factual knowledge.
The present study suggests a basis for understanding
the nature of ideals from the knowledge accumulated through
the studying of evolution of man and that any paradigm for
the scientific inquiry in the domain of human values should
include the concept of ideals in its postulates. The
following chapter will be devoted to the question of how our
present-day knowledge of evolution has given us a new concept
of man and his destiny, hitherto left untapped for incorpora-
tion into a theory of value for educational purposes.
CHAPTER VI
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF BECOMING:
ROLE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
The ancient Chinese realized that man's quest for
relevance at all times, no matter how illumined he becomes,
will always center around three basic and distinct areas of
interest, viz., man versus nature, man versus man, and man
versus his own 'self.' The integrated knowledge gained in
pursuit of these interests affords the basis for a compre-
hensive philosophy of man, which in turn then serves as the
basis for understanding the process of his becoming.
The spectacular advances in the biological sciences
have made significant contributions to our understanding of
the nature of man and the meaning of order and disorder as
they relate to his growth in his environment. The light
thrown on the significance of time in the process of man's
becoming is one of the chief contributions of the biological
sciences. Everything has a past from which it has emerged
and a future toward which it moves, and hence all things
man and mankind inclusive -- are immersed in a ceaseless
process of change in a continuum along a time dimension
towards some ultimate goal or in accordance with some ulti-
mate purpose.
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Scope of Evolutionary Biology
While all things, animate and inanimate, fall some-
where along the above continuum, the study of living things
makes this process of change more observable. It is mainly
from the study of living entities that the great idea of
evolution sprang -- an idea that appears to be applicable
to everything in the universe. Though theories of cosmic
and terrestrial evolution have appeared in the VISHNU PURANA
of the ancient Hindus, biological evolution has been the
subject of intense study of the theoretical biologists over
the last century. The advent of Darwin is rooted in our
minds to such extent that few can conceive of any other non-
his torical
, non-evolutionary or non-developmental approach
to the study of any phenomenon. Pitrim Sorokin admits:
The stand point of 'origin, development and evolution' is
our mainstay in studying anything from religion to the
stock market.” Teilard de Chardin affirms that position:
Is evolution a theory, a system, or a hypothesis?
It is much more -- it is a general postulate to which
all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must hence-
forward bow and which they much satisfy in order to
be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light which
illuminates all facts, a trajectory which all lines
of thought must follow -- this is what evolution is
(Teilard de Chardin, 1965, p. 219).
The term "evolution," which has been given the meaning
"sustained change" in biological literature, has been more
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recently 1 defined succinctly as
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Evolution, then in the broadest sense of the word, is
the name we assign to the comprehensive plan or sequence in
all events, ideas and thought. In biology, the idea that
is central to the evolution of organisms is that everything
is what is by virtue of a process of growth and development
involving a long chain of interrelated antecedents.
Theoretical understanding of how the various species
of living things came into being and inquiry into the nature
of the processes in their temporal development is the theory
of evolution.
The original concepts of Charles Darwin, viz., inheri-
table variations, adaptative and natural selection, have
been abundantly confirmed, elaborated and often improved
upon by investigation over the past century by the study
of fossils (macroevolution) and also by the study of
1. Over fifty of the world's leading experts on evolu-
tion worked out this definition during the proceedings
of a convention of scientists from all over the world
in 1950, sponsored by the University of Chicago to
celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the publi-
cation of Darwin’s Origin of the Species .
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invertebrates -- submicroscopic living organisms
bacteria, viruses or fungi (microevolution)
. As
observes
:
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h3S helped in understandingu o the stellar systems (Dobzhansky, 1958).
Macroevolution cannot be observed at work; we observe only
the end products of its action in our lifetime. However, a
phage biochemist or a geneticist can study microevolution
in his laboratory in his lifetime.
Today there is a strong consensus that the Darwinian
view of evolution can be characterized by the following
?
two postulates:
a) that all events that lead to a production of new
genotype, such as mutation, recombination and
fertilization, are essentially random and not
in any way selected, and
b) that the order in the organic world manifested in
the numerous adaptations of organisms to the
physical and biotic environment, is due to the
ordering effect of natural selection (Mayr, 1962,
p. 85).
For a biologist the animal, plant, or micro-organism
he is working with is but a link in an evolutionary chain
2. This is sometimes called 20th century Darwinism or a
synthetic theory of evolution, so called because it
is a new synthesis from all fields of biology and
not an offspring of any one of the numerous preceding
theories
.
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Of changing forms, none of which has any guarantee of per-
manence. Hence for him there is hardiy any structure or
function in an organism that can be fully understood unless
it is studied against this background. The study of evolu-
tion teaches us certain modesty in our ability to make
accurate statements about the nature of man; anything
affirmed about his nature should be done with implied under-
standing and a qualification -- "at this point of his growth
and development along the evolutionary line..." With this
tentativeness comes an attitude of expectancy concerning
new human possibilities that may emerge as evolution proceeds
As Phenix states:
Biology fosters a view of man as engaged in a con-tmuing adventure drawn on to new levels of fulfill-
ment by the lure of future possibilities. The humanfuture is open rather than closed. Moreover, the
evolutionary picture shows that man's beings andbecomings are intimately connected. Man is what he hasbecome; and his present being is what it is by virtue
of the long struggle for more successful adaptation
to the environment. Therefore, the individual be-
coming of man and the evolutionary becoming of mankind
are mutually illuminating -- an insight embodied in
the old dictum that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"(Phenix, 1964, p. 31). * 7
Present-day biologists' contributions to our under-
standing of the nature of man and his own place in the
universe, represent a convergence, synthesis and interpre-
tation of all biological disciplines, e.g., genetics,
paleontology, embryology. Theoretical biology is concerned
with interpreting the logic and methodology of the science
of living organisms; since it establishes the foundations of
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biological knowledge, it may be said to form a branch of
logic and epistemology. Theoretical physics, now a well
established discipline, has its own speculations about the
nature of the physical universe and this in turn has pro-
found consequences for dealing with problems of general
philosophy. Only recently have we been able to notice the
relevance of biological topics, such as the mechanisms of
evolution or mechanisms of perception, to the branches of
philosophy. We can now see the role of theoretical biology
in providing a critical, reflective and methodological
clarification which will serve as a bulwark against super-
stition, dogma and fallacy. Albert Schweitzer ( 1947 ) once
wrote that our age has discovered how to divorce knowledge
from thought, with the result that we have indeed a science
which is free, but hardly any science left that reflects .
Biology is in a position to assume a role of reflection in
assisting man in his quest for meaning.
Understanding the mechanisms of man’s evolution,
biological and cultural, has ethical, ideological and
philosophical implications that are far reaching. The main
question which evolutionists are concerned with is whether
cosmic, human and biological evolution are three unrelated
entities, or, are integral parts of a single process of
evolution. To be more specific, are biological, mental
(psychological) and cultural evolution of the human species
stages of a single universal process? In the emergence of
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man has the emphasis of evolution been shifted from the
biologic and organic to the psychological and the cultural?
What light does evolutionary biology throw on the problem of
purpose and teleological explanations in biological organisms?
Since man is the only known product of evolution that can
make a distinction between what is from what ought to he .
does the study of his evolution clarify for us the nature
of the good at which he should aim? Does it enable us to
understand more precisely the meaning of moral judgments
concerning what ought and ought not to be done? Is man's
ethical judgment, and consequently his behavior, related to
his own evolutionary growth? Is there any purpose in human
evolution? These, none will deny, become poignant issues of
personal and social urgency, too critical to be left ignored.
While dealing with the above issues in depth is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, however, summaries of a few
of the most impressive contributions which have relevance to
a study of these issues will be dealt with in the following
pages. These contributions fall into the following categories
a) Mechanisms of human evolution in contradiction
to pre-human evolution.
b) Pathways adopted by organisms to maintain their
identity at any one point in its evolution amidst
constant change in the environment.
c) Our understanding of the reasons for the bio-
logical uniqueness of man.
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d) Speculations about the emergence of new possi-
bilities of patterns and organization for collec-
tive evolution of mankind and the vector of the
direction of this evolution.
Mechanisms of the Human Evolutionary System
The biological evolutionary system as seen today can
be envisaged as a synthesis of the classical theory of
evolution by natural selection, an idea which for the first
time crystallized the problem of cumulative change in the
biological world, and the advances in Mendelian genetics.
Contemplative analysis of the idea of "survival of the
fittest which plagued the minds of post Darwinian evolu-
tionists, wedded to the concept of natural selection, led to
the understanding that the crucial matter is not survival
but hereditary transmission of genes and most important of
the nature of the interactions between the environment
and the biological organism in which these genes are carried.
To obtain a better picture of the evolutionary mechanism,
Waddington proposed a system involving four factors:
A genetic system, which engenders new variation by
the process of mutation and transmits it by chro-
mosomal genes; an epigenetic system, which translates
the information in the fertilized egg and that which
impinges on it from the environment into the characters
of the reproducing adult; an exploitive system, by
which an animal chooses and modifies the environment
to which it will submit itself; and a system of natural
selective pressures originating from the environment
and operating on the combined result of the other
three systems (Waddington, 1960, p. 94).
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Socio-Genetic System
. While all the above factors of
the biological evolutionary system undoubtedly persist in
the human situation, an extraordinarily important step
characterizes his evolution and this accounts for his unique
ability to undergo acculturation, change his mode of
thinking, living, etc., without a corresponding genetic
change in his biological make up. As Huxley describes it:
In this. phase a new mechanism of continuity and
Ke“ri963“p. SS)f'Varl,ti0n ° f mind 3nd ltS Products
It operates by what anthropologists call a cultural system,
involving the transmission using elaborate symbol systems of
cumulative, organized experience, conceptual knowledge,
beliefs, feelings and aspirations of the previous generation
made available to the succeeding ones. In effect a new mode
of heredity transmission, which Waddington designates as
socio-genetic system," is in operation in human evolution
in contradistinction to pre-human evolution. This does not
imply that biological evolutionary mechanism found in pre-
humans has ceased to operate in man, nor does it mean that
genes are irrelevant, and as Dobzhansky puts it:
The genetic equipment of mankind endows it with
a capacity of cardinal importance, that to acquire
and to transmit from generation to generation the
knowledge and the skills to control the environment.
Every succeeding generation can, if it so chooses
,
stand on shoulders of the preceding ones and aspire
to ever greater attainments. The emergence of this
genetic equipment was the evolutionary masterstroke
which placed our species at the summit of the living
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Evolutionary biology has thus brought to a sharp focus the
existence of a non-genetical system of heredity in man and
has placed the onus for his evolution on the powers of his
brain and consciousness and not that of his body (Huxley,
1953). Human advancement, henceforth, does not depend on
the Darwinian concept of "survival of the fittest” involv-
ing ruthless physical competition in fighting the environ-
ment and in fulfilling drives and instincts as seen in the
pre-human evolution. The direction of human development
as portrayed by Darwin gave no ontologically ingrained
purpose either in nature or in whole man as a creature of
nature.
3. One of the greatest neurologists, Herrick, has shown
that in the course of the evolutionary development
of life, the motor apparatus took the lead. All
plants and the most primitive animals function without
nervous systems. In the course of the development of
man, the motor apparatus took precedence over the
other parts (Herrick, 1956) .
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Huxley's Humanism
.
4
Many thinkers have impressively
attempted to exploit this new understanding of human evol-
ution given by evolutionary biology for guidance as to how
human affairs should be conducted in the future. Julian
Huxley ' s humanist philosophy as elaborated in several of his
writings stems from such an understanding of human evolution
(1953, 1963, 1964, 1971).
Evolutionary biology has undoubtedly contributed a
great deal to our knowledge about man and his environment
and offers a scientific prognosis of man's future. We
know now more about man's nature and his potentialities. If
man has potentialities to be actualized, then man, in the
first place, must have the tremendous potentiality of
evolving; he is individually and collectively not an end
state but a process. Biological evolution of man has led
to a higher order of evolution sometimes referred to as
cultural evolution, and very definitively, as Huxley con-
tends, evolution is now passing from a stage determined
primarily by the biological process of natural selection to
one determined by conscious effort. The cultural evolution
4. The humanist tradition comes to modern man from the
ancient world of Greeks, who first developed the
conception of life guided by reason and later on
during the 18th century provided the core of the
modern idea of progress. The humanist tradition
developed man's faith in his own reasoning powers
-- in his ability to govern himself, solve his own
problems and improve his way of life.
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of mankind is superimposed on its biological
the stages of the former are non-biological
contrary to the laws of the latter.
evolution
without be
and
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The significance of cultural evolution can hardly be
exaggerated. The development of the languages and litera-
tures of the world, of media of mass communication, of
science and technology, have altered immeasurably man's
mode of existence.
What is of particular significance is man’s increased
potential for guiding the course of future evolution. He
has certainly gained powers, through his understanding of
the mechanisms underlying natural phenomena and of the means
of predicting and controlling natural events, to make the
bearers of certain genotypes more or less successful in
survival and reproduction.
The human condition is changing both culturally and
biologically. Although the cultural evolution overshadows
the biological, the two are connected by feedback relation-
ships; culture has a biological foundation. Natural selec-
tion continues to operate in a modern mankind, but its
action is supplemented by artificial selection. The problems
of the management of human evolution are, however, as much
sociological as they are biological. The success of any
progress depends on the creation of favorable conditions
for human development and self-actualization. Mankind is
at a stage of cultural evolution which tests the evolutionary
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strategy that led to man. His choices are crucial and agon-
izing. but he cannot defer them or avoid them. Even the
deliberate suppression of rational behavior, as Ravin writes,
is a choice and will have evolutionary consequences (Ravin,
1970). What is of particular significance is man's increased
potential for guiding the course of human evolution. In
fact, as Huxley sees it, it is difficult to imagine how man,
given his present powers and the rate of acquiring and
transmitting knowledge, can possibly avoid intervening in
further evolution. Commenting on the knowledge explosion as
a result of socio-genetic transmission since the advent of
Darwin, Huxley writes:
Its upshot is clear. Man is not merely the latest
dominant type produced by evolution, but its sole
active agent on earth. His destiny is to be respon-
sible for the whole future of the evolutionary process
on this planet. Whatever he does, he will affect
that process. His duty is to try to understand it
and the mechanisms of its working, and at the same
time direct and steer it in the right direction
and along the best possible course.
This is the gist and core of Evolutionary Humanism,
the new organization of ideas and potential action
now emerging from the Humanist Revolution of thought,
and destined, I prophesy with confidence, to become
the dominant idea-system of the next and critical
phase of psychosocial evolution (Huxley, 1971)
.
Human evolution then implies the transformation and
education of his primitive animal nature in larger and
larger measure so that the becoming man shapes further the
evolution of his own nature in terms of the ideals, goals,
and values he prizes, selects, and nurtures. This means
the creation and transmission of ideals that come to
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determine the paths of his evolution. In essence, then,
human evolution cannot be understood unless values are
understood in terms of his yet to be actualized potenti-
alities and evolutionary possibilities.
Social Homeorhesis
What is distinct about living things is not only the
fact that they develop but the manner and direction of the
development. Organisms are characterized by their ability
to preserve constancy in the midst of change. Living matter
has the astonishing power of duplicating itself by incor-
porating materials from the environment according to the
pattern of its own being or true identity. Homeostatic
mechanisms within each organism keep it alive by enabling
it to adjust itself so that the conditions of viability are
always met. The capacity of living matter to keep adjusted
in this way preserves its identity amidst changes.
This property of constancy amidst change is possible
primarily because living things are 'open systems.' Accord-
ing to the second law of thermodynamics the energy transfor-
mation in a self-contained or closed physical system takes
place in such a way that entropy^- is increased. That is
1. Entropy refers to a measure of the randomness of ene rgy
distribution in a system or the degree of molecular
disorder. This measure gives a clue to the amount of
unavailable energy in a system toward a useful purpose
served by the system.
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to say, all energy changes in an isolated mechanical
proceed m a direction of greater disorder. Living
by virtue of their being open systems have the abili
maintain themselves against disordering influences.
(Bertalanffy , 1968.)
system
organisms
ty to
Living organisms are classified as open systems be-
cause they exchange matter and energy with their surround-
ings in such a way as to perpetuate themselves and develop.
A fundamental ontological principle in all living things is
then the conservation of an organic order. In the case of
humans, the affirmation of existence or, put differently,
the will to live, seems to be an inherent property.
Living things not only conserve order but they also
evolve toward more complex structures hierarchically
organized. Piaget hypothesises:
"Life is essentially autoregulation. The explanation
of evolutionary mechanisms, for so long shackled
to the inescapable alternatives offered by Lamarckism
and classical neo-Darwinism, seems set in the direction
of a third solution, which is cybernetic and is, in
effect biased toward the theory of autoregulation."
(Piaget, 1971, p. 26.)
And for him cognitive processes are results of such auto
regulation. As Edmund Sinott points out in Cell and Psyche
,
what appears as organizing forces in the elementary forms of
life and as organic drives in the higher forms of pre-human
species manifests itself as conscious purpose in man.
(Sinott, 1950.)
The ubiquitous phenomenon which characterizes self-control,
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regulation and maintenance found at every level of bio-
logical organization - nuclear, nucleolic, cytoplasmic,
organellic
, cellular, glandular, somatic, was termed
homeostasis by the famous Harvard biologist Cannon ( 1932 ),
and may be defined as the ability of the organism to com-
pensate for the changes in its environment, both micro and
macro, to compensate for changes in such ways that its
normal functioning proceeds undiminished. Homeostasis
within the body includes regulation of body temperature,
water, concentration of salt, sugar and other nutrients.
For instance if too much carbon dioxide, accumulates in
the blood, the animal breathes faster to absorb more oxygen
thus removing carbon dioxide until the balance is restored.
Such a restoration of the status quo is homeostasis. Such
regulative mechanisms of self correction are operative in
any system, open or closed, which has a specific function
or purpose. Servomechanisms designed by man have homeo-
static controls built into them. In the case of evolution
or development what is restored is not the 'status quo' but
the normal path and direction of change. Waddington proposed
the term "homeorhesis"^ for such a situation where there is
a return to the original path of development rather than a
return to an original stabilized state . The homeorhetic
1 . Derived from Greek word 'flow' to replace 'stasis'
which implies standing still.
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mechanism serves to bring back the organism to the stabilized
necessary path of development or evolution. These paths or
trajectories are termed "chreods" 1 by Waddington (1969).
This intuitive leap of the creative embryologist in intro-
ducing a new nomencleture to represent genuinely the mechan-
ism of autoregulation in a developing (becoming) entity,
brings new dimensions in organismic biology while it allays
the fear of those who attributed mechanistic connotations
to the concept of homeostasis. For eg., Bonner writes:
.As a mode of describing the adjustive and protectiveimpulses of the individual, the homeostatic analogyis convenient and useful, and it fits well the ex-
cessive demand for simplicity and economy. However,
as a model for constructive behavior, it is whollyinadequate. It can tell us much about the nature ofbeing, but next to nothing about the process of
becoming : of man 1 s hopes and dreams, aspirations and
longings, dedications and commitments. Homeostasis is
a static concept which conceals and distorts the
essence of psychological growth and becoming" (Bonner,
1965, p. 133). (Emphasis mine.)
During development it is the richness and precisive
qualities of the environmental interactions, epigenetic
influences as Waddington would call them, that determine
the processes of developing, evolving (or becoming). Any
activity guided by purpose has to have homeorhetic mechan-
isms which put the organism constantly in chreods which
lead to consummation of its intended goal (subjective aim).
1. Derived from two Greek words meaning 'necessary
path.
'
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The energy derived, for example, by the metabolism of
nutrients are tapped by the homeorhetic mechanism to put
the organism into chreods leading to maintain the bio-
logical integrity of the developing organism over time.
According to Cannon (1932) in Wisdom of the Body
, the
human body is impeccably unified and integrated for one
single purpose - survival.
Whitehead affirms that "the life aim of survival is
modified to human aim of survival for diversified worth-
while experiences" (1938, p. 43). It is evident that mere
survival as the primary purpose of genetic and physiolog-
ical homeorhesis, is too narrow a conception given their
limits, to serve as adequate mechanisms to maintain the
chreods for psychological, social and spiritual purposes
or ideals. More significant in man’s evolution, then, are
the psychological and social homeorhetic mechanisms which
have to be learned and acquired; thus, such mechanisms
are dependent on socio-genetic transmission which has
definite effects on non-biological evolution. The concept
of homeorhesis as it relates to social advancement and
human evolution is tacit in our minds. Terms like self-
control, security, self-fulfillment, cooperation, peace,
tranquility which carry implications of homeorhesis indicate
that although the term may be new the concept is not.
Certain principles established in organismic biology
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are transferable to social sciences and some of the gener-
alizations made especially from the study of mammalian
group behavior have been substantiated in anthropological
and sociological studies in communities around the world.
Social progress can then be equated with increased homeorhesis
or integration arising out of mutual cooperation which is
the key to individual and group evolution. (Emerson, 1954,
1960.)
Energy spent in an inorganic system is toward dis-
integration while in living organisms -- open systems --
the energy is spent toward integration in the direction of
higher order, of more complexity of greater specialization
in organization. Increasing complexity in organisms is
possible only when cells begin to coordinate their functions
and activity in some way, i.e., increased homeorhesis in
the organism as a whole. A degree of specialization is a
prime requisite for any efficient operation and to evolve
progressively, human societies must produce greater func-
tional efficiency, i.e., increased social homeorhesis.
Whitehead writes:
’’The Universe achieves its values by reason of its
coordination into societies of societies, and in
societies of societies of societies. Thus an army
is a society of regiments, and regiments are societies
of men, and men are societies of cells, and of blood,
and of bones, together with the dominant society of
personal human experience, and cells are societies of
small physical entities such as protons, and so on.
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Also all
ambient
1967, p.
of these societies presuppose the
° f social Physical activity"
circum-
(Whitehead
,
One important element in this process of integrated
action - cooperation - is the moral value for the individual
unit taking part in the process. Cooperation as a form of
social homeorhesis is the method by which all living beings
m a social system facilitate the proper channelling of their
collective energy derived from their actualized potentialities
in ways which are mutually beneficial.
Human Evolution and a Vision of the Future ^
While the ethical, ideological and epistemological
implications of our understanding of the mechanism of
human evolution have been brought to light by the works of
Dobzhansky
,
Huxley and Waddington, the contributions of
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, hold preeminence and are of
particular significance to the scope of the present study,
for Teilhard stands as a formidable figure of a pioneer in
the forefront of attempts to relate evolution to man's
ultimate concerns.
All during his scientific career, which was devoted
to the study of geology, mammalian paleontology and anthropology,
5. References given in this section are of Teilhard de
Chardin unless otherwise mentioned.
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and while engaged in numerous travel adventures with pro-
longed stays in the orient Teilhard de Chardin had a hidden
agenda constantly in his mind -- the understanding of the
phenomenon of man, a creature caught between immensity and
nothingness and understanding his place in the universe.
His intellectual rigor and scientific training, whatever
others may think or write about it.^
Since it is beyond the scope of the present study even
to attempt to epitomize Teilhard's cosmology, only a few
of the many issues that Teilhard addressed will be dis-
cussed below in the form of propositions extracted from his
works that have relevance for a comprehensive value theory
as envisaged by the ANISA Educational Model.
The parameter of complexity . The central theme of
Teilhard's scientific thinking was evolution -- not just
biological but extended to encompass the whole of reality.
Outside the context of cosmogenesis
,
Teilhard believed
anthropogenesis could not be understood. From his paleonto-
logical work on mammals he drew certain fundamental con-
clusions which he could convincingly generalize to aspects
of man's evolution and prognosis of man's future. He
6. In the estimation of both Simpson, the American
paleontologist and Medawar, the British biologist,
Teilhard ranked very low as a scientist (Simpson,
1960; Medawar, 1961).
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found that life was flexible and progressive; being flexible
it was liable to change, and being progressive, evolution
does not proceed in a random manner but it is oriented. As
to the nature and direction of the orientation, Teilhard
concluded that the line of evolution following the most com-
plex brain (organized brain) was the most successful and
this represented a privileged axis. For him man marks the
end of one phase of development of created things and the
beginnings of another new one. He shows how our puny view
of man in the face of the limitless space and expanding
universe can be completely reversed when we view everything
from the chemical or biochemical aspect of complexity and
organization (1966, p. 14-36). For him the parameter of
complexity when used as the criteria enables one to dis-
tinguish a genetic classification of all creations that have
evolved during eons of time. Jean Piveatu commenting on
this grand scheme of Teilhard illumines Teilhard’s vision.
The order of complexity corresponds to their
chronological order of emergence. Now let us look
at the universe from this perspective. Take the
biggest objects for a start -- the nebulae. Their
substance is extremely tenuous and is probably just
hydrogen; that is, the simplest element of matter:
one nucleus plus one electron.
Going up one step in immensity, we look at the
stars. They are much more complex compared with the
nebulae. But stars do not go beyond a certain stage;
they are the laboratories where nature manufactures
atoms from primeval hydrogen -- nothing more.
It is on the dark planets alone -- and nowhere
else -- that we have the opportunity to pursue this
mysterious ascent of the world towards higher com-
plexities and where the evolutionary effort devoted
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principally to the manufacture
henceforth be concentrated.
of large molecules will
Amon g these planets, at any rate, in our solar
system, earth is probably the only one which is life-
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be the sole center where the synthesis
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eCVles goes on > and the living creatureswhich inhabit it probably represent M the most complex
compositions to emerge from planetary geochemistry."ihus, life no longer looks like a dirty stain
upon some tiny point in space but appears as "the
specific effect of the complexification of matter"(Piveatu, 1971, p. 181).
Thresholds of evolution
. Concentrating on the planet
earth, Teilhard shows that billions of years of physio-
chemical evolution (geogenesis) followed by evolution of
life (biogenesis) had to precede the emergence of thought
of consciousness leading to psycho- social evolution
(noogenesis)
,
and these three distinct stages of planetary
evolution represent a single but succeeding and progressive
evolution in one unitary direction.
Although the parameter of increasing complexity en-
ables us to find a meaning in the evolution of the universe,
it is not sufficient, as Teilhard tells us, to determine
the direction of evolution after the appearance of life
(1965) . The more complex the living organism, the more
complex, self-centered and self-conscious it becomes. Such
a form of complexity is determined due to the organ con-
trolling the perception of the organism, the brain. The
only way of evaluating the quality of the organ is by the
level of organization. For him since man is the only
101
conscious animal with the most organized brain in this
planet, he is necessarily the most valuable creation.
Teilhard (1966, p. 22) succinctly portrays this in his
uniquely represented 'curve of complexity' (Fig. II) in
which the Y axis represents in centimeters the diameter of
the principle objects in nature identified so far by
science from the smallest to the largest. The X axis
represents an attempt to express conceptually the degree of
complexity in aggregates of matter.
Evolutionary series considered by Teilhard represents
three thresholds. The threshold between matter, life and
man and new qualities emerge as evolution progresses through
these thresholds. This view is in complete accord with the
views of emergent evolutionists, e.g., Morgan, who hold
that evolution of the stuff of the universe accounts for
new properties including life and consciousness. For
7. The importance of the concept of mind and con-
sciousness in the behavioral sciences has
received attention only recently. Waddington
observes
:
"So long as mind remains a phenomenon unmentioned
in the vocabulary of the physical sciences, one
can have no complete confidence that the stock of
concepts at present used in those disciplines will
ever be able to encompass it." After this cautions
understatement, he rightly emphasizes the positive
duty of science to tackle "all aspects of the
phenomena of life, including mind" (Waddington,
1957, p. 1) .
NATURAL CURVE OF COMPLEXITIES*
A. POINT OF VITALISATION
B. POINT OF HOMINISATION
(CONSCIOUS REFLECTION)
FIG H
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Teilhard de Chardin. Man’s Place in Nature .
New York: Harper and Row, 1966
.
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Morgan who recognized three kinds of natural systems,
matter, life and mind, evolution is a progressive advance
with novelty or the actualization of the unrealized possi
bilities
.
According to emergent evolution, as I seek todevelop its thesis, there is an increasing hierarchyof kinds of orders of relatedness ranging fromthose that obtain m the atom, in the molecule, inthe crystal and so on near the base pyramid, to that
m
°rd
?£
° £ reflec
J
ive consciousness near the apex(Morgan, 1927, p. 148). y
True to the tradition of emergent evolutionists de-
fining progress, Teilhard writes: MLet me here repeat the
two fundamental equations or equivalents which we have
established:
Progress = growth of consciousness
Growth of Consciousness - effect of organization
(1959, p. 72)
.
,
'PlanetizationM of humanity . Having given a version
of the evolution of the human mind, he also gives us a
vision of the ultimate condition of the earth and the trend
of planetary evolution. The trend prevailing in the evol-
ution of the noosphere, sphere of consciousness and self-
reflection, (the noogenesis) is toward what Teilhard desig-
nates as "planetization" and "megasynthesis" (1959). This
implies radical convergence and integration of the physical,
cultural and ideological branches of mankind. The mega-
synthesis is a gigantic psycho-biological operation in which
104
love and cooperation is the main agent leading to unity in
diversity.
As early as in 1920 (published only in 1959), Teilhard
wrote
:
It is mankind as a whole, collective humanity,
which is called upon to perform the definitive
act whereby the total force of terrestrial evolu-tion will be released and flourish; an act in
•n?\ the £ul * consciousness of each individual manwill be sustained by that of every other man not
only living but the dead (1959).
Possibilities for the future . Having clarified our
ideas of the evolution of the mind and given us an idea of
future possibilities, Teilhard articulates the kind of
action such knowledge requires of us, for as he believed,
If progress is to continue, it will not do so on
its own accord.
If indeed an almost limitless field of action lies
open to us in the future, what shall our moral dis-
positions be, as we contemplate this march ahead?
I can think of two, which may be summarized in
six words: a great hope held in common .
a) First, the hope.... A passionate longing
to grow, to be, is what we need. There
can be no place for the poor in spirit,
the skeptics, the pessimists, the sad of
heart, the weary and the immobilists.
Life is ceaseless discovery. Life is
movement.
b) A hope held in common. Here again the
history of Life is decisive. Not all
directions are good for our advance: one
alone leads upward, that which through
increasing organization leads to
greater synthesis and unity.... Life moves
towards unification. Our hope can only be
realized if it finds its expression in
greater cohesion and greater human solidarity
(1959, p. 75) .
CHAPTER VII
BIOLOGICAL DIMENSION TO THE VALUE THEORY
OF THE ANISA MODEL
Road Traversed
Both the crises in the social sciences and lack of
communication among those who are involved with the study
of human values, demand an integrated statement of value
theory based on empirical and theoretical developments in
various branches of human knowledge concerned with values.
It has become evident that educational objectives cannot be
adequately conceived unless they are formulated in the light
of a value theory that affords a perspective on all problems
involved which the theory is designed to help solve.
Attention has been drawn in the previous chapters to
the need for a unified approach to the study of value
phenomenon since values are derived from all aspects of
human existence and experience, from one's self and one's
environment. The potential impact of a comprehensive value
theory well grounded in both human actualities and possi-
bilities in understanding and guiding the process of man's
true becoming, has been recognized. How values and value
systems are developed are studied in strikingly divergent
and piecemeal manner by various psychological and social
studies according to their conception of human nature and
destiny. Man's views of himself and his world, whether
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validated or not, are the primary determinants of his be-
havior.
Perspectives obtained from current theories reviewed
in chapters three, four, and five, point out to one basic
concern. No matter how comprehensive becomes our under-
standing of the value phenomena, value systems and the con-
ditions and contexts in which they arise, we still need a
set of conceptual guidelines from some other dimension
of human reality which will serve as general frame of
reference to validate the postulates of a value theory. A
case is made in chapter five for broadening the paradigm of
value inquiry, irrespective of nature of the discipline
which initiates it, by including the concepts of subjective
aim and ideals^ which in the ultimate analysis serve as the
blueprint for structuring actualized potentiality - for
creating values. For as expressed by Whitehead
"the life of a human being receives its worth,
its importance, from the way in which unrealized
ideals shape its purposes and tinge its actions.
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 27.)
The views obtained on the nature of man and his destiny
from the vantage point of modern theories of biological
evolution as represented by the works of Huxley, Waddington
and Teilhard de Chardin, have been the main thrust of
1. Pages 12-15.
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chapter five,
as follows:
the salient aspects of which can be summarized
a)
ac?ount 0* life is continuous
,
Y progressive advance into noveltymarked by stages of increasing levels of oreani-
]J
ovln2 irreversibly toward higher forms
f h hlch ha^e new and distinguishing properties
oJp^f ??
Se of m
^
n consciousness 2 has emerged asne o the most important new properties and hasmade possible the creation of a cuUure t?ansmissible to succeeding generations throughlearning. 5
b) Man, because he is a cultural and conscious socialbeing has already influenced and will continueto influence the future of his own evolution as
a species.
c) Evolutionary progress in biological organisms,
including man, can be equated with improved
homeorhesis within the ecosystem of the universe.
d) Human evolution has become the quest for per-
fection through consciously determined goals and
ideals which in themselves become determinants
of the homeorhetic path and thereby effective
instruments in the evolution of humankind.
e) Man will meet the greatest challenge in the course
of his biological and cultural history as he tries
to understand himself, appreciate the future
possibilities open to him, and begins to take
an active and deliberate hand in shaping his own
destiny.
2. From the points of view of both Huxley and Teilhard de
Chardin, it may appear that evolution is nothing but
growth of consciousness. It may be anthropocentric to
hold that consciousness to be of primary importance
and in my opinion the positions of the above two
scientists should be taken with the tacit understan-
ing that this view is only relative to a truly
evolutionary cosmic perspective which is that con-
sciousness represents only one quality of an infinite
number of qualities possible in the evolving universe.
Emergence of consciousness on earth as a natural
activity is only a recent event in a geological time
scale
.
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The above serve as empirical and theoretical refer-
ents to the ANISA theory of value, which is outlined in
the following pages.
Theories of Evolution and Organismic Philosophy
The contributions of theoretical biology whose sole
concern has been the problem of the nature and evolution of
organization in living things, has tremendous impact on
the age old philosophical quest of the nature of reality
in the universe. Sounding death knell to both mechanistic
and vitalistic views of the universe, the empirical and
theoretical advances in evolutionary biology, strengthen
the organismic' view of the universe, thus supporting a
major shift in the paradigm which fostered the mechanistic
conception of the universe originating from classical New-
tonian physics.
The fundamental thread that runs through all the
advances in theoretical biology, which represents a con-
vergence, synthesis and interpretation of break throughs of
all the biological disciplines, e.g., genetics, embryology,
paleontology and molecular biology, is the incontrovertible
evidence concerning the high degree or organizational com-
plexity in living things and idea that the reality of any
organism cannot be understood apart from its form of
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organization in the process of evolution. 3 From the biol-
ogist’s standpoint, the organic conception of the world
involves succession in time and in space; evolution is seen
as a creative advance into novelty characterized by a
progressive intensification of higher principles of life.
The cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead continues
to receive increasing support from the advances of modern
evolutionary theories. Whitehead has always appreciated
the structure of our cosmos in terms of different ontological
levels. His views regarding these levels are congruent
with those of Teilhard de Chardin expressed in his ’’curve
of complexity” (p. 102).
"In surveying nature, we must remember that there
are not only basic organisms whose ingredients are
merely aspects of eternal objects (i.e., the ultimate
particles of physics, each of which is related to
everything else in the universe by its bare co-
existence). There are also organisms of organisms.
Suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity,
we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and
hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the
atoms and the molecules are organisms of a higher
type, which also represent a compact definite organic
unity. When we come to larger aggregations of matter,
the organic unity fades into the background. It
appears to be but faint and elementary, it is there,
but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It is a
mere aggregation of effects. When we come to living
beings, the definiteness of pattern is recovered and
the organic again rises into prominence.” (Whitehead,
1925, p. 161.)
3 . This has an important corollary that any static or
purely conservative view of man and his social
institutions, becomes untenable.
no
Consciousness and the "Lure" of the Future
Evolutionary theory brings to a sharp focus the rela-
tion between "life” and "matter" which has perplexed every
biologist who ever tried to reconcile his knowledge of
living organisms with the "mechanistic model" of the universe
derived from classical Newtonian Physics. It is the basic
tenet of emergent evolutionists that everything has a past
from which it moves and hence all things -- matter, life,
mind, consciousness, man and mankind -- are immersed in a
ceaseless process of evolution and change in a continuum
along a time and organizational complexity dimension. Thus
evolution is a progressive advance into novelty, complexity
of organization and actualization of enfolded possibilities,
with matter, (geogenesis) life (biogenesis), mind (noogenesis
or genesis of consciousness) as distinct thresholds or
boundary conditions separating different ontological levels.
On the nexus between matter and life, Whitehead remarks:
"In the overall picture, there is one of life as a passage
i
from mere physical order to mental novelty to coordinated
inheritance of mental novelty" (Whitehead, 1929, p. 164).
It is evident that with the emergence of consciousness,
a landmark in man's evolution, comes the possibility and
increased potential for man to guide his own evolution.
Awareness connotes reflection on the past, present and the
future. All biological species have evolved but as
Dobzhansky (1958) puts it, "only man is the sole product
Ill
of evolution who knows he has evolved and has
evolve.” As Phenix states (1964):
continued to
"Man is engaged
the new levels
possibilities .
"
5??tinuin 2 adventure drawn onot fulfillment by the lure of future
Quest for 'worthwhile experiences. ' Alfred North
Whitehead proposes that we can best explain evolution of
living forms if we recognize a three-fold urge in organisms
in which
the art of life is first to be alive, secondly tobe alive m a satisfactory way and thirdly to acquire
an increase in satisfaction (Whitehead, 1958, p. 8).
Man, as portrayed in the cosmology of Whitehead and
Teilhard de Chardin, is an emergent creature and cannot be
understood apart from his inner pressure of subjective aim
for progressive and creative advance into novelty. Again
Whitehead brings to our attention that:
the life aim of survival is modified into human
aim at survival for diversified worthwhile
experience (Whitehead, 1938, p. 43).
The above statements of Whitehead can be regarded as propo-
sitions which affirm the ontologically ingrained purpose in
human evolution. Theories of biological evolution
recognize "creative" natural selection (Simpson, 1947) as
the directive force in this urge to acquire an increase in
satisfaction and make a bold prognosis of man's future.
Evidence from evolutionary biology points out unmistakably
that since the emergence of consciousness is a relatively
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new phenomenon in phylogeny, man has scarcely begun to ex-
haust the possibilities of creative ways of increasing the
quality of life or pursuing ’’worthwhile experiences;" he
is just in the very early stages of appreciating the "lure"
of future possibilities.
One of the unique properties of consciousness is
subjective awareness of knowing and knowing that we know.
Knowing that we know presupposes subjective awareness of
not knowing -- the ability to know when we don’t know. Since
the more we know the more control we can exercise over the
environment, gaining knowledge is the door to increasing
effectance. But we can only consciously set about to learn
something if we know that there is something unknown that
we want or need to know. Hence the capacity to be aware of
unknowns, itself a product of evolution, becomes one of its
4
chief servants . It enables us to relate to unknowns in
ways that yield knowledge which will assist us to secure
the conditions of survival and improve its quality. One
of the most problematical unknowns is our own future. How
we relate to that unknown concerns the central dynamic in
value formation. The structuring of this unknown -- the
future -- and the orientation toward possibilities of
'diversified worthwhile experiences' or anticipation of
4. I am greatly indebted to Professor Jordan for sharing
this during a discussion on July 30, 1974.
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actualizing potentialities, gives rise to the formation of
ideals. An ideal is the structuring of the unknown; it is
a non-actual reality effective in the present as it in-
fluences our interaction with the environment thereby re-
structuring the pattern of energy utilization which means
restructuring values. Human goals and aims are not only
motivated by individual needs but also by the ideals which
one strives to actualize.
It is an incontrovertible face that man’s awareness
of the future possibilities or unactualized potentialities
makes man his own maker. This has moral consequences of
the most profound nature. As Whitehead puts it: ’’The
effect of the present upon future is the business of morals"
(1967, p. 269)
.
It is these ideals, then, which act as the goad for
structuring and restructuring the pattern of energy utili-
zation of man's already actualized potentialities as he
moves toward the future. The role of ideals in under-
standing the art of man's becoming has been recognized by
all writers on self-actualization. Commenting on mystical
experiences William James writes:
The appearance is that in this phenomenon something
ideal, which in one sense is part of ourselves and in
another sense is not ourselves, actually exerts an
influence, raises our centre of personal energy,
and produces regenerative effects unattainable in
other ways. (1958, p. 394.)
While Humphries (1968) points out:
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Human values and experiences cannot be adequately under-
stood without extending their frame of reference from the
merely biological and biosocial to the ideal or transcendent
dimension. A theory of value is inevitably a facet of any
theory of being and becoming because becoming presupposes
some actuality in process, and process presupposes poten-
tiality. By choosing ideals, man takes charge of his own
destiny. This conscious control is isomorphic with learning
competence; it enables man to arrange his own environment
and guide his own interaction for actualization of some
ideal. Mumford writes:
"Every transformation of man except that perhaps
which produced neolithic culture, has rested on a
new metaphysical and ideological base; or rather
upon deeper stirrings and intuition whose rationalized
expression takes the form of a new picture of the cosmos
and the nature of man" (Mumford, 1962
,
p. 171 ).
If education is to transfer and transform the cultural
heritage consciously, the role of ideals in actualizing
future possibilities and potentialities of man and mankind,
can hardly be exaggerated. The new definition of culture
given by Sorokin becomes very relevant in the light of the
above consideration:
Culture may be defined as the human activities
formulating progressively understanding and
appreciating and actually creating, all that
which is possible to classify within the broad domains
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? r truth, aestheticand^mora! achievement or goodness
activity
(Cowell
,
or beauty
1970
,
With such a comprehensive view of evolution, with the
role of ideals and values in it, and such a redefinition of
culture, many branches of human activity will assume new
directions. Education as conceived by the ANISA MODEL will
be the chief among them.
ANISA Theory of Value
The following propositions characterize the founda-
tions for the ANISA value theory and represent the general
orientation and guiding principles of any future value
inquiry in the Model's development. These propositions
which are necessarily presented in a very general form can
be further elucidated only within the context of the
philosophical base of the ANISA MODEL (Jordan and Shepard,
1972) and the theories of development (Kalinowsky and
Jordan, 1973) and volition (Conway, 1973) derived from its
philosophy.
Man’s becoming involves the process of actualizing
his potentialities which is sustained by interaction with
the environment. The actualized potentialities are
structured and these structures determine learning. The
patterns of utilization of the energy available to the
becoming man are when they are relatively enduring, called
values
.
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The fusion includes volitional elements and hence
values always have an evaluative or decision making com-
Ponent. This aspect has implications for increasing
individuals effectance thus emergence of values is inex-
tricably bound with the process of becoming.
The pattern of energy utilization and the ends to
which the energy is used define the self and constitute
the structure of personal identity.
Chief among the factors in the dynamics of structuring
the pattern of energy utilization are the subjective aim,
purpose, ideals and the "lure" from the environment. In
the ultimate analysis these factors become the primary
determinants in human behavior.
Values and the value systems of the individual, the
society and the culture become valid only to the extent
that the determinants that structure the energy pattern
themselves are validated.
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The subjective aims or the ideals that serve as the
'lure' for the structuring of the pattern of utilization
Of human energy obtain their validation on the basis of
whether or not they facilitate homeorhesis both in onto-
genesis and phylogenesis, to put mankind into chreods
leading to greater levels of collective organization and
human solidarity because this guarantees and increases the
quality of survival.
epilogue
BUILDING A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION: PROSPECTS
It is my firm conviction that the emergent concepts
arising from the cross fertilization of all those studies
that have to do with our knowledge of man and his becoming
should be the corner stones of the future edifice of the
science of education. "All systems of education and of
research," observes Rene Dubos, "have been organized on an
analytic pattern. What science has been successful at, by
remaining for 350 years faithful to the Cartesian doctrine,
is to take any kind of problem and dissociate it into its
components. This is what universities are organized to do
both research and training" (Dubos, 1967, p. 13). No major
breakthrough in education can come about unless there is a
high degree of integration and application of the vast body
of research from several disciplines that have contributed
to our understanding of human growth and development.
ANISA is a mission-oriented institution that has been
precisely designed to provide the kind of integration sorely
needed for research and action, and has provided a blueprint
for a system of education for man to be able to actualize
his full range of potentialities. The ANISA educational
model makes no pretention to completeness in its articula-
tion of the basic constructs that go into building its
theory
.
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In an age of piecemeal analysis ANISA's venture may
seem to be a hopelessly broad undertaking. Educators of
this era find themselves in the same positions as the
scientific pioneers of the earlier centuries. No syste-
matic body of knowledge for a scientific foundation for
education can be built up from any one discipline. Without
such a foundation no superstructure can be built. It is
clear that the primary educational need of our time is to
formulate, however tentatively, the underlying principles,
assumptions, and theories upon which educational research,
planning, and implementation can rest and with that as the
basis seek to build up a systematic body of knowledge by
testing out hypothesis generated from the theories.
Educators may ignore or be apathetic to the problem
of systematizing educational theory building on a scientific
basis, but in the meantime, schools and other related in-
stitutions are making decisions without the benefit of
any basic philosophy or organized body of knowledge to guide
their decision making. It may be argued that without such
collaborative research, the principles of the science of
man - his being and becoming - may. not be understood. But
with 6000 years of social history and all the wit and
wisdom of the scientists, philosophers, saints, and seers
at our disposal, it would seem that at least a speculative
beginning on the science of man and his becoming should be
made. Resorting to speculative leaps should not be
120
as
[e
labelled as a subjective treatment of the inquiry. The
biggest blind spot that thwarts such attempts by educators
and behavioral scientists is their inability to admit,
Bonner (1965, p. 32) puts it, "that 'objective' knowledg,
can be obtained by 'subjective' means."
Educators, who are in the business of building a
'science of education' must take lessons from the philosophy,
development, and history of science; one of the lessons
conveyed to us by developments in modern physics is the key
role of speculation in science. Indeed the great physicists
of the twentieth-century such as Einstein, Max Planck and
Heisenberg, as affirmed in their biographies, arrived at
their theories by means of speculative thinking. Complete
empirical proof is neither possible nor necessary in
science, for "proof" says Eddington (1929), "is the idol
before whom the pure mathematician tortures himself."
It is possible, after testing out the relevant hypotheses,
that no discoverable principles exist in the science of man
and even if they exist there is no certainty that universal
agreement on them can be achieved. But a similar uncer-
tainty holds true in all the other scientific endeavors as
well. Newtonian physics was challenged by the theory of
relativity. Those before Einstein regarded Newtonian
Physics as virtually a divine revelation of the nature of
reality; subsequently this belief had to be modified. The
atom defined as the ultimate particle has finally come apart
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and startled the world. As some one remarked, "The path
of scientific discovery is always strewn with wrecks of
discarded hypothesis." And yet, those false assumptions
served an essential purpose in the progress of science.
Science is not an unchanging, static set of propositions,
nor a permanent body of approved facts. Quite obviously it
changes and the changes are not merely additions of knowledge
but also revisions of basic tenets and rejections of pre-
vious assumptions, now demonstrated to be inadequate.
Discovery of pseudo-bricks in the structure of science
has not deterred the scientist from contributing to the
building of hypotheses, to move from failure to victory in
his conscious attempt to control natural forces. It would
seem logical to assume even though our present day knowledge
of the true nature of man, his ultimate destiny, and the
ecological system that maintains his integrity individually
and collectively is limited, an attempt to speculate on
them is worth while.
In education there is an implied frame of reference in
certain guiding principles that are commonly used, but
these are rarely made explicit. In ANISA’s view, if they
are formulated clearly and used as a starting point it
would facilitate the much needed communication among the
members of the community involved in educational practice.
It would likewise make possible the building of a coherent
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body of knowledge that would make education relevant to and
more powerful in serving the needs of everchanging societal
needs
.
An essential part of any scientific inquiry, as Phenix
puts it, is the creation of conceptual categories suitable
to the subject matter to be investigated which then, of
course, should be used to construct theories and paradigms.
A theory, if it is to be scientific, cannot remain aloof in
the world of logic and conceptual categories but must have
implications for action. A significant property of scien-
tific theories which is not so often remembered by those who
discuss it, as observed by Waddington (1962, p. 12) is
that its value is quite largely dependent on its power of
suggesting the next step in scientific advance. In fact
at the growing edges of science the stimulating and suggestive
theory is often preferred to one which may be less open to
criticism but which seems to lead us nowhere in particular.'
APPENDIX
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A Summary Statement on the AN ISA* Model 1
The ANISA model represents a comprehensive educational
system functionally defined by specifications which insure
its replicability, evaluation, and refinement. The speci-
fications set forth educational objectives pertaining to
the actualization of human potential and explanations of
how to achieve them. These objectives and explanations
are derived from a coherent body of theory which has been
deductively generated from a philosophical base and in-
ductively validated to whatever extent possible by findings
from empirical research.
Tue philosophy underlying the model is organismic
in nature; it defines man as a spiritual as well as a
material being; explains his reality in terms of the
process of his becoming (actualization of potentiality)
,
accounts for his qualities of transcendence and immanence,
and sets forth fundamental ontological principles which
explicate man's relationship to the universe.
The body of theory derived from the philosophy
includes
:
A Theory of Development which defines develop-
ment as the translation of potentiality into
actuality and equates that translation with
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creativity; establishes two broad categories of
potentialities -- biological and psychological;
identifies proper nutrition as the essential
element in the development of biological poten-
tialities and learning as the key factor in the
release of psychological potentialities;
establishes five categories of psychological
potentialities -- psycho
-motor
,
perceptual,
cognitive, affective, and volitional; establishes
interaction with the environment as the means by
which development is sustained; fixes three
basic categories of environment (physical, human
and the unknown) and establishes the Self as
the micro-cosmic reflection of the three environ-
ments and the most constant aspect of the environ-
ment it experiences; and, categorizes interactions
in terms of their power to facilitate development
and safeguard survival.
A Theory of Curriculum which fixes the overarch-
ing goal of education as the actualization of
human potentialities and their structuring into
identities around ideals which guarantee survival
and perpetually improve its quality; establishes
two categories of goals or objectives of the
formal educational system -- content goals and
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process goals; specifies the substance of the
former as the information culture has accumulated
organized in terms of the classification of
environments, including the symbol systems used
to convey that information, and the substance
of the latter as formation of internal structures
on which learning competence depends (i.e., content
goals may specify what to think about, while
process goals concentrate on how to think)
;
accounts for the emergence of personal identity
(character formation) in terms of value formation
and defines values as the relatively enduring
structurings of potentialities (process) as they
are actualized and integrated with information
(content) assimilated about the various environ-
ments; and, specifies three value sub-systems
(material, social, and religious/aesthetic) on
which three higher order competencies rest
(technological, moral and spiritual/philosophical)
and which combine to form the total values system
that constitutes the personality -- the Self.
A Theory of Pedagogy which defines teaching as
arranging environments and guiding the child’s
interaction with them for the purpose of achiev-
ing the goals specified by the curriculum theory;
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outlines the diagnostic, prescriptive, specula-
tive, experimental, and improvisat ional aspects
of arranging environments and guiding interaction
so that instruction is individualized and learning
particularized thereby guaranteeing equality of
educational opportunity.
A Theory of Administration which identifies two
basic functions of administration which must
remain in dynamic equilibrium -- leadership and
management -- and defines them in terms of service
consistent with purpose as specified by the phil-
osophy; provides the rationale for differentiat-
ing the staff, maintaining morale, establishing
institutional priorities, assessing needs, iden-
tifying resources, determining feasibility, and
allocating resources to achieve objectives as
efficiently as possible; provides the means for
institutional self -renewal ; and, accounts for
the necessity and nature of community and home
involvement.
A Theory of Evaluation which designates compara-
tive analysis of children’s interactions with
particular environments and their developmental
consequences as the focal point of inquiry;
seeks to relate means to ends, distinguishing
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efficient from final causes; and allies the pur-
pose of evaluation with the heuristic, explanatory
and predictive functions of research and science.
Because the model rests on the universal processes of
growth and development, it has cross-cultural applicability
and addresses directly the problem of how to achieve equal
educational opportunity.
1. See Appendix in Raman, S. P. (ed.) Nutrition, develop-
ment ai
?
d learnin
g
' selected readings^ New York:
MSS Information Corp., 1974.
ANISA is both a word and an acronym. As a word, it has
Greek and Latin roots which refer to a flowering tree whose
fragrance has made it attractive as a symbol. It has been
adopted to represent "the tree of life” --an ancient symbol
connoting shelter, beauty and grace, and the perpetual
growth and fruition of organic life. As an acronym, ANISA
stands for American National Institutes for Social Advance-
ment, an incorporated not-for-profit organization under
whose auspices the efforts to formulate the model were
undertaken
.
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